Muriel Niederle

Prof. Muriel Niederle


Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

24Years (2003-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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6 May 2015 in The Quarterly Journal of Economics
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NANed Augenblick
Ned Augenblick
MNMuriel Niederle
Muriel Niederle
CSCharles Sprenger
Charles Sprenger
Experimental tests of dynamically inconsistent time preferences have largely relied on choices over time-dated monetary rewards. Several recent studies have failed to find the standard patterns of present bias. However, such monetary studies contain often-discussed confounds. In this article, we sidestep these confounds and investigate choices over consumption (real effort) in a longitudinal experiment. We pair this effort study with a companion monetary discounting study. We confirm very limited time inconsistency in monetary choices. However, subjects show considerably more present bias in effort. Furthermore, present bias in the allocation of work has predictive power for demand of a meaningfully binding commitment device. Therefore our findings validate a key implication of models of dynamic inconsistency, with corresponding policy implications.

1 June 2021 in Management Science
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KCKatherine B. Coffman
Katherine B. Coffman
CEChristine L. Exley
Christine L. Exley
MNMuriel Niederle
Muriel Niederle
Although there is ample evidence of discrimination against women in the workplace, it can be difficult to understand what factors contribute to discriminatory behavior. We use an experiment to both document discrimination and unpack its sources. First, we show that, on average, employers prefer to hire male over female workers for male-typed tasks, even when the two workers have identical résumés. Second, and most critically, we use a control condition to identify that this discrimination is not specific to gender. Employers are simply less willing to hire a worker from a group that performs worse on average, even when this group is, instead, defined by a nonstereotypical characteristic. In this way, beliefs about average group differences are the key driver of discrimination against women in our setting. We also document some evidence for in-group preferences that contribute to the gender discrimination observed. Finally, our design allows us to understand and quantify the extent to which image concerns mitigate discriminatory behavior. This paper was accepted by Yan Chen, decision analysis.

7 October 2008 in Negotiation Journal
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MNMuriel Niederle
Muriel Niederle
LVLise Vesterlund
Lise Vesterlund
Negotiating in a highly competitive environment may prove particularly challenging for women. We describe three experimental studies that investigated and documented differences in the competitive behaviors of men and women. The first study examined gender differences in competitive performances. In a setting in which men and women performed at similar levels in single-sex competitions, men were found to outperform women in mixed-sex competitions. The second study focused on the decision of men and women to enter a competition. In a mixed-sex setting in which we found no gender differences in performance, many more men than women chose a compensation scheme in which they had to compete against others. Finally, we report the results of a recent study that examined an institutional intervention that may encourage more women to compete. Specifically, we found that a quota-like affirmative action environment in which women must be equally represented encourages many more women to compete. This response was greater than one would predict based solely on the increase in one's chances of winning and can be partially explained by the fact that the affirmative action competition was more gender specific.

1 January 2010 in Econometrica
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AIAsen Ivanov
Asen Ivanov
DLDan Levin
Dan Levin
MNMuriel Niederle
Muriel Niederle
We use a second-price common-value auction, called the maximal game, to experimentally study whether the winner's curse (WC) can be explained by models which retain best-response behavior but allow for inconsistent beliefs. We compare behavior in a regular version of the maximal game, where the WC can be explained by inconsistent beliefs, to behavior in versions where such explanations are less plausible. We find little evidence of differences in behavior. Overall, our study casts a serious doubt on theories that posit the WC is driven by beliefs. Copyright 2010 The Econometric Society.

1 August 2004 in Gastroenterology
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MNMuriel Niederle
Muriel Niederle
ARAlvin E. Roth
Alvin E. Roth

19 June 2013 in Games
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Journal Article
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MNMuriel Niederle
Muriel Niederle
ARAlvin E. Roth
Alvin E. Roth
MÜM. Utku Ünver
M. Utku Ünver
Markets sometimes unravel, with offers becoming inefficiently early. Often this is attributed to competition arising from an imbalance of demand and supply, typically excess demand for workers. However this presents a puzzle, since unraveling can only occur when firms are willing to make early offers and workers are willing to accept them. We present a model and experiment in which workers’ quality becomes known only in the late part of the market. However, in equilibrium, matching can occur (inefficiently) early only when there is comparable demand and supply: a surplus of applicants, but a shortage of high quality applicants.