With sustainability becoming the new norm, the discussion about followers’ attitudes towards sustainability-oriented leadership is growing globally. Therefore, this study investigates the extent to which employees’ industry and sector background influence their perception of the ideal leader in relation to preferred sustainability orientation. This study also examines preferred sustainability leadership values and the role of culturally endorsed leadership in this process. Using the Preferred Sustainability Leadership Orientation (PSLO) survey, we gathered and analyzed data from 11 countries and 11 industry backgrounds (n = 5530). Our findings show that there is a statistical significance in followers’ valuing a leader with a high sustainability orientation most. Moreover, our results indicate that respondents working in public administration organizations value a leader with a strong sustainability orientation in addition to environmental and equality goals. While respondents associated with agriculture and real estate do not seem to place so much value on an ideal leader focusing on gender equality, in industries such as finance, manufacturing, and real estate, followers seem to value a leader with a stronger focus on profit and less emphasis on promoting gender equality. This research offers implications for the development of the PSLO (preferred sustainable leadership orientation) as a useful sustainability leadership barometer tool for measuring an organization’s sustainability culture and suggests avenues for future research.
Consider a multi-agent systems setup in which a principal (a supervisor agent) assigns subtasks to specialized agents and aggregates their responses into a single system-level output. A core property of such systems is information asymmetry: agents observe task-specific information, produce intermediate reasoning traces, and operate with different context windows. In isolation, such asymmetry is not problematic, since agents report truthfully to the principal when incentives are fully aligned. However, this assumption breaks down when incentives diverge. Recent evidence suggests that LLM-based agents can acquire their own goals, such as survival or self-preservation, a phenomenon known as scheming, and may deceive humans or other agents. This leads to agency loss: a gap between the principal's intended outcome and the realized system behavior. Drawing on core ideas from microeconomic theory, we argue that these characteristics, information asymmetry and misaligned goals, are best studied through the lens of principal-agent problems. We explain why multi-agent systems, both human-to-LLM and LLM-to-LLM, naturally induce information asymmetry under this formulation, and we use scheming, where LLM agents pursue covert goals, as a concrete case study. We show that recently introduced terminology used to describe scheming, such as covert subversion or deferred subversion, corresponds to well-studied concepts in the mechanism design literature, which not only characterizes the problem but also prescribes concrete mitigation strategies. More broadly, we argue for applying tools developed to study human agent behavior to the analysis of non-human agents.