Yongjie Yang

Dr. Yongjie Yang

Chair of Economic Theory, Saarland University, 66123 Saarbrucken, Germany

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

16Years (2011-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

View All Publications
24 October 2019 in IEEE Internet of Things Journal
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
LWLi wenjun
Li wenjun
HXHuayi Xu
Huayi Xu
HLHuixi Li
Huixi Li
YYYongjie Yang
Yongjie Yang
Pradip SharmaPradip Sharma
Pradip Sharma
Saurabh SinghSaurabh Singh
Saurabh Singh

18 September 2019 in Algorithms
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
YSYash Raj Shrestha
Yash Raj Shrestha
YYYongjie Yang
Yongjie Yang
Algorithmic decision-making has become ubiquitous in our societal and economic lives. With more and more decisions being delegated to algorithms, we have also encountered increasing evidence of ethical issues with respect to biases and lack of fairness pertaining to algorithmic decision-making outcomes. Such outcomes may lead to detrimental consequences to minority groups in terms of gender, ethnicity, and race. As a response, recent research has shifted from design of algorithms that merely pursue purely optimal outcomes with respect to a fixed objective function into ones that also ensure additional fairness properties. In this study, we aim to provide a broad and accessible overview of the recent research endeavor aimed at introducing fairness into algorithms used in automated decision-making in three principle domains, namely, multi-winner voting, machine learning, and recommender systems. Even though these domains have developed separately from each other, they share commonality with respect to decision-making as an application, which requires evaluation of a given set of alternatives that needs to be ranked with respect to a clearly defined objective function. More specifically, these relate to tasks such as (1) collectively selecting a fixed number of winner (or potentially high valued) alternatives from a given initial set of alternatives; (2) clustering a given set of alternatives into disjoint groups based on various similarity measures; or (3) finding a consensus ranking of entire or a subset of given alternatives. To this end, we illustrate a multitude of fairness properties studied in these three streams of literature, discuss their commonalities and interrelationships, synthesize what we know so far, and provide a useful perspective for future research.

1 August 2013 in Journal of Computer and System Sciences
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
JWJianxin Wang
Jianxin Wang
YYYongjie Yang
Yongjie Yang
JGJiong Guo
Jiong Guo
JCJianer Chen
Jianer Chen

1 August 2019
Verified
Conference Paper
Closed access
YYYongjie Yang
Yongjie Yang
We study the complexity of several manipulation and control problems for six prevalent approval based multiwinner voting rules. We show that these rules generally resist the proposed strategic types. In addition, we also give fixed-parameter tractability results for these problems with respect to several natural parameters and derive polynomial-time algorithms for certain special cases.

1 September 2019 in Theoretical Computer Science
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
WLWenjun Li
Wenjun Li
HLHaiyan Liu
Haiyan Liu
JWJianxin Wang
Jianxin Wang
LXLingyun Xiang
Lingyun Xiang
YYYongjie Yang
Yongjie Yang

1 July 2018
Verified
Conference Paper
Closed access
YYYongjie Yang
Yongjie Yang
JWJianxin Wang
Jianxin Wang
Multiwinner voting aims to select a subset of candidates (the winners) from admissible sets, according to the votes cast by voters. A special class of multiwinner rules—the k-committee selection rules where the number of winners is predefined—have gained considerable attention recently. In this setting, the admissible sets are all subsets of candidates of size exactly k. In this paper, we study admissible sets with combinatorial restrictions. In particular, in our setting, we are given a graph G whose vertex set is the candidate set. Admissible sets are the subsets of candidates whose induced subgraphs belong to some special class G of graphs. We consider different graph classes G and investigate the complexity of multiwinner determination problem for prevalent voting rules in this setting. In addition, we investigate the strategyproofness of many rules for different classes of admissible sets.