In the context of agent-based simulation framework of collusion, this paper seeks for two-sided tacit collusion among supply-side and demand-side participants in a constrained network and impacts of this collusion on the market outcomes. Tacit collusion frequently occurs in electricity markets due to strategic behavior of market participants arose from daily repetition of energy auctions. To attain detailed analysis of tacit collusion, state-action-reward-state-action (SARSA) learning algorithm and the standard Boltzmann exploration strategy based on the Q-value are used to model market participants’ behavior. A model is presented that integrates exploration and exploitation into a single framework, with the purpose of tuning exploration in the algorithm. In order to appraise the feasibility of collusion, a theoretical study on a three-node power system with three scenarios is depicted considering three Gencos and two Discos which proves the formation of two-sided tacit collusion between Genco and Disco. Simulation results show different collusive strategies of participants and how parameters of the algorithm impact on simulation outcomes. It is also shown that congestion on transmission line has a significant influence on behavior of market participants.
With the continued global rise in investments in renewable energy technologies, the share of these resources in electricity generation has significantly increased. While these technologies provide numerous benefits, such as reducing CO2 emissions, decreasing reliance on fossil fuels, and creating new jobs, there are growing concerns about their direct and indirect negative impacts on electricity markets. If policymakers aim to provide significant quantities of power from intermittent renewable resources, it might significantly affect the market, as these resources may not consistently meet demand due to their reliance on natural conditions. Therefore, the growing integration of renewable energy sources (RES) in a restructured electricity market has created challenges, which are explored in this paper. The findings indicate that the integration of RES can lead to significant changes in market price behavior. A substantial share of RES in electricity generation capacity results in lower wholesale market prices, higher price spikes, and increased price volatility. Furthermore, an increased share of renewable energy sources may diminish the effectiveness of forward contracts in curbing market power within wholesale electricity markets. Also, the intermittent nature of renewable energy sources, such as solar and wind can increase the cost of ancillary services due to the greater need for storage and emergency supply.