Simon Handley

Prof. Simon Handley


Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

35Years (1992-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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1 December 2000 in Cognition
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
JEJonathan St.B.T Evans
Jonathan St.B.T Evans
SHSimon Handley
Simon Handley
NPNick Perham
Nick Perham
DODavid E Over
David E Over
VTValerie A Thompson
Valerie A Thompson

1 January 2003 in Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
JEJonathan St. B. T. Evans
Jonathan St. B. T. Evans
SHSimon Handley
Simon Handley
DODavid E. Over
David E. Over
The authors report 3 experiments in which participants were invited to judge the probability of statements of the form if p then q given frequency information about the cases pq, p not q, not pq, and not p not q (where not = not). Three hypotheses were compared: (a) that people equate the probability with that of the material conditional, 1 - P(p not q); (b) that people assign the conditional probability, P(q/p); and (c) that people assign the conjunctive probability P(pq). The experimental evidence allowed rejection of the 1st hypothesis but provided some support for the 2nd and 3rd hypotheses. Individual difference analyses showed that half of the participants used conditional probability and that most of the remaining participants used conjunctive probability as the basis of their judgments.

1 February 2007 in Cognitive Psychology
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
DODavid E. Over
David E. Over
CHConstantinos Hadjichristidis
Constantinos Hadjichristidis
JEJonathan St. B.T. Evans
Jonathan St. B.T. Evans
SHSimon Handley
Simon Handley
SSSteven A. Sloman
Steven A. Sloman

1 May 2004 in Thinking & Reasoning
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
SHSimon Handley
Simon Handley
ACA Capon
A Capon
MBM Beveridge
M Beveridge
IDI Dennis
I Dennis
JEJ St Bt Evans
J St Bt Evans
The ability to reason independently from one's own goals or beliefs has long been recognised as a key characteristic of the development of formal operational thought. In this article we present the results of a study that examined the correlates of this ability in a group of 10-year-old children (N = 61). Participants were presented with conditional and relational reasoning items, where the content was manipulated such that the conclusion to the arguments were either congruent, neutral, or incongruent with beliefs, and either logically valid or logically invalid. Participants also received a measure of working memory capacity (the counting span task) and a measure of inhibitory control (the stop signal task). Indices of belief bias and logical reasoning on belief-based problems were predicted independently by both measures. In contrast logical reasoning on belief neutral problems was predicted by working memory alone. The findings suggest that executive functions play a key role in the development of children's ability to decontextualise their thinking.

1 January 2005 in Psychological Review
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
JEJonathan St. B. T. Evans
Jonathan St. B. T. Evans
DODavid E. Over
David E. Over
SHSimon Handley
Simon Handley
P. N. Johnson-Laird and R. M. J. Byrne proposed an influential theory of conditionals in which mental models represent logical possibilities and inferences are drawn from the extensions of possibilities that are used to represent conditionals. In this article, the authors argue that the extensional semantics underlying this theory is equivalent to that of the material, truth-functional conditional, at least for what they term "basic" conditionals, concerning arbitrary problem content. On the basis of both logical argument and psychological evidence, the authors propose that this approach is fundamentally mistaken and that conditionals must be viewed within a suppositional theory based on what philosophical logicians call the Ramsey test. The Johnson-Laird and Byrne theory is critically examined with respect to its account of basic conditionals, nonbasic conditionals, and counterfactuals.

1 January 2004 in The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology Section A
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
SNStephen E. Newstead
Stephen E. Newstead
SHSimon Handley
Simon Handley
CHClare Harley
Clare Harley
HWHelen Wright
Helen Wright
DFDaniel Farrelly
Daniel Farrelly
Three studies are reported, which examined individual differences in deductive reasoning as a function of intellectual ability and thinking style. Intellectual ability was a good predictor of logical performance on syllogisms, especially where there was a conflict between logic and believability. However, in the first two experiments there was no link between ability and performance on indicative selection tasks, in sharp contrast to previous research. This correlation did, however, return in the final study. Our data are consistent with the claim that the correlation with logical accuracy on abstract selection tasks is found primarily with participants of relatively high ability. At lower levels, pragmatically cued responses are given but those of slightly higher ability divorce the rule from the scenario and respond consistently (though incorrectly) across problems. Self-report questionnaires were generally poor predictors of performance, but a measure of the ability to generate alternative representations proved an excellent predictor. These results are consistent with a mental models approach to reasoning and also have implications for the debate about human rationality.