Langevin dynamics is a versatile stochastic model used in biology, chemistry, engineering, physics and computer science. Traditionally, in thermal equilibrium, one assumes (i) the forces are given as the gradient of a potential and (ii) a fluctuation-dissipation relation holds between stochastic and dissipative forces; these assumptions ensure that the system samples a prescribed invariant Gibbs-Boltzmann distribution for a specified target temperature. In this article, we relax these assumptions, incorporating variable friction and temperature parameters and allowing nonconservative force fields, for which the form of the stationary state is typically not known a priori. We examine theoretical issues such as stability of the steady state and ergodic properties, as well as practical aspects such as the design of numerical methods for stochastic particle models. Applications to nonequilibrium systems with thermal gradients and active particles are discussed.

Android Protected Confirmation (APC) is an authentication protocol designed by Google. It leverages the extra security of the Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) to secure transactions even in the presence of a compromised OS. The intended security guarantee for APC is that if a transaction has been signed under APC, then the user must have previously given its explicit consent, even if an attacker has gained root access to the victim's Android OS. In this paper, we present a security analysis of APC in the Universal Composability (UC) framework. We uncover two attacks on the design of the protocol which allow a root adversary to issue transactions without the user consenting to them. We provide an attack implementation on a Google Pixel phone, and propose light-weight fixes. Finally, we specify the ideal UC functionality capturing the intended security guarantees for APC, and prove that the fixed protocol UC-realizes it.