Despite the spread of Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) and their interest among academicians and policy-makers, many investigations generally treat them as a homogenous mode of governance neglecting their different forms. The present work investigates the factors that determine the concrete form of PPP finally adopted. We use the Transaction Costs Theory (TCT) to analyse 11,821 PPPs in 110 developing countries from 1997 to 2017. The results show that the greater the amount of specific investment and the more unfavourable the context in which it is implemented, PPP adopts forms where the private party has a greater degree of control.

In this research, we analyse how project risk allocation strategies impact the volume of private investment in renewable energy projects with the participation of both the public and private sectors. To this purpose, we analyse a sample formed by 2215 projects performed in 73 developing countries in the period 1997-2019 involving the following technologies: solar, hydro, wind, waste, biogas, biomass, and geothermal. Our findings reveal that those projects performed through governance schemes in which the private partner takes more project responsibilities attract more private money. Additional drivers for attracting private investment at the project level and institutional level are found. Furthermore, we reveal that the transference of project risks to the private partner emerges as a very relevant project feature that interacts with some of the project and institutional factors, revealing both complementary and substitution effects. The significance of this research extends beyond academia, since there are factors influencing private investment that can be controlled by various stakeholders in projects (such as policymakers, private investors, and project managers). Understanding their impact, significance, and interaction effects-factors that sometimes moderate or accentuate private investment-is crucial. The identified patterns illuminate optimal risk allocation practices, offering practical insights to enhance the effectiveness and sustainability of projects.

Purpose: Some scholars argue that corruption hinders economies and investment because it generates extra costs, while others suggest that it can act as a stimulus. Their mixed empirical findings have prompted the analysis of whether investors' attitude towards corruption changes depending on its degree of prevalence.Design/methodology/approach: The authors examined 4,518 public–private partnerships (PPPs) located in 46 developing countries for the period 1997–2017. The data were collected from the World Bank PPP database. The authors investigated the relationship between the amount of investment in PPP projects and the level of corruption using regression with multilevel mixed effects.Findings: Corruption and the amount of investment in PPP projects are inversely related at the low and high end of the spectrum of corruption, but the relationship is positive towards the middle. Further analysis revealed that this was spurred by high investment PPP projects in less developed countries.Originality/value: The findings allow the authors to reconcile the opposing positions in the literature through a “sand–grease–sand the wheels” effect between the volume of investment and corruption, which can be configured as a reverse S-shape consisting of three stages.