Major projects are the important platform for enhancing a country’s comprehensive national power and strengthening its capacity for independent innovation. Although major projects in China have made remarkable achievements, willingness to cooperate and innovate has not achieved the desired target. In this paper, the evolutionary game model of cooperative innovation behavior of general contractors and subcontractors is constructed by considering reputational factors. Through theoretical derivation, the influence of the distribution ratio of collaborative innovation benefit, spillover technology absorption capacity, and reputation discounting coefficient on innovation behavior is analyzed. Finally, MATLAB software is used to simulate the dynamic evolution process of strategy selection. The results show that (1) a reasonable benefit distribution coefficient can promote the evolution of innovation behavior in a positive direction; (2) both the reduction of innovation cost and the increase of spillover technology absorption capacity can make the innovation subject more inclined to choose the active collaborative innovation strategy; and (3) it is the higher-than-threshold reputation loss that can effectively inhibit the “free-rider” behavior. The research conclusions and managerial implications can provide reference for improving the willingness to cooperate in major projects’ technology innovation.

Under the development mode of deep blending of emerging technologies, major projects are important for enhancing China's comprehensive national strength and independent innovation capability. Based on the social benefits of major projects, and considering the influence of reputation factors, an evolutionary game model composed of a general contractor and subcontractor of major projects is established. This paper studies the influence of various factors including the income distribution coefficient of collaborative innovation, and MATLAB simulation software is analyzed the influence of factors on an evolutionary path. The results show that a reasonable income distribution coefficient can promote the game behavior of both parties to the direction of active collaborative innovation; The reduction of innovation cost and the improvement of spillover technology absorption capacity can make innovation subjects tend to choose active collaborative innovation strategies. In addition, reputation loss above a specific threshold can effectively inhibit free-riding behavior and encourage innovation subjects to choose active collaborative innovation strategies. The research results provide reference for promoting major projects' technology innovation.