Karim Lounis

Dr. Karim Lounis

orcid

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

8Years (2019-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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11 May 2020 in IEEE Access
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
KLKarim Lounis
Karim Lounis
MZMohammad Zulkernine
Mohammad Zulkernine
The Internet of Things, abbreviated as IoT, is a new networking paradigm composed of wireless and wired networks, geographically distributed and interconnected by a “secured” backbone, essentially, the Internet. It connects billions of heterogeneous devices, called Things, using different communication technologies and provides end-users, all over the world, with a variety of smart applications. IoT constitutes a new evolution for the Internet in terms of diversity, size, and applications. It also invites cybercriminals who exploit IoT infrastructures to conduct large scale, distributed, and devastating cyberattacks that may have serious consequences. The security of IoT infrastructures strongly depends on the security of its wired and wireless infrastructures. Still, the wireless infrastructures are thought to be the most outspread, important, and vulnerable part of IoT. To achieve the security goals in the wireless infrastructures of IoT, it is crucial to have a comprehensive understanding of IoT attacks, their classification, and security solutions in such infrastructures. In this paper, we provide a survey of attacks related to the wireless infrastructures of IoT in general, and to the most used short-range wireless communication technologies in the resource-constrained part of IoT in particular. Namely, we consider Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, ZigBee, and RFID wireless communication technologies. The paper also provides a taxonomy of these attacks based on a security service-based attack classification and discusses existing security defenses and mechanisms that mitigate certain attacks as well as the limitations of these security mechanisms.

24 November 2022 in IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
KLKarim Lounis
Karim Lounis
SDSteven H. H. Ding
Steven H. H. Ding
MZMohammad Zulkernine
Mohammad Zulkernine
With the continuous miniaturization of electronic devices and the recent advancements in wireless communication technologies, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), in general, and Small Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (SUAVs, a.k.a., drones), in particular, are becoming progressively used by the civilian sector within the context of a variety of applications, bringing great convenience to the public. However, due to their resource-constrained nature, risky environmental application, and wireless way of communication, drones are not immune from cyberthreats. As a consequence, the security of drones (SUAVs) has recently gained significant attention by the research community. In particular, when it comes to inter-drone communication. Although traditional cryptographic techniques may provide a certain level of security, they actually constitute a heavy burden on SUAVs due to their resource-constrained nature. In the light of enforcing the security of inter-drone communications, this paper proposes a lightweight drone-to-drone authentication protocol, called D2D-MAP, that uses PUF (Physical Unclonable Function) technology. We design the protocol and evaluate its resilience against various attacks. We use resource-constrained hardware to implement the authentication protocol and perform an evaluation of its performance. We show that the protocol's security and the obtained performance are prominent compared to state-of-the-art authentication protocols, and that they conform to SUAVs security and performance requirements.

25 October 2022 in IEEE Transactions on Intelligent Transportation Systems
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
MEMarwa A. Elsayed
Marwa A. Elsayed
MWMichael Wrana
Michael Wrana
ZMZiad Mansour
Ziad Mansour
KLKarim Lounis
Karim Lounis
SDSteven H. H. Ding
Steven H. H. Ding
MZMohammad Zulkernine
Mohammad Zulkernine
Aerospace and defense industries are particularly vulnerable to cyber threats given their sensitive nature, significantly extending the consequences of security breaches to the national level. Aerospace vehicles are augmented by cooperative control, intelligent, connected, and autonomous systems. The risk against such systems is further amplified due to commonly relying on the MIL-STD-1553 communication bus developed with a high focus on reliability and fault tolerance, albeit with security as a second priority. MIL-STD-1553 (a.k.a., STANAG 3838 by NATO) is a standard that describes a serial data communication bus primarily used in aerospace vehicles for military and civilian applications, including avionics, aircraft, and spacecraft data handling. In the absence of core security measures such as authentication, authorization, and encryption, the bus connecting sensitive functions, including autopilot, GPS, fuel valve switches, and other avionics equipment, is easily vulnerable to a wide range of attacks. This paper proposes, AdaptIDS, a novel adaptive intrusion detection system as a security analytics framework for the MIL-STD-1553 communication bus. AdaptIDS mainly adopts data science principles and leverages advanced deep learning techniques (i.e., the stacking ensemble) to boost its generalization capabilities for detecting unseen patterns of attacks in the dynamic changing environment of aerospace vehicles. Extensive experiments are conducted using two datasets generated from an open-source simulation system, reflecting dynamic real-life scenarios. The evaluation results demonstrate that our solution outperforms existing solutions with high detection effectiveness of 0.99 F1-measure and computational time efficiency.

4 October 2021 in IEEE Access
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
KLKarim Lounis
Karim Lounis
MZMohammad Zulkernine
Mohammad Zulkernine
As security has always been an afterthought of innovation, the security of IoT (Internet of Things), in general, and authentication, in particular, has become a serious research challenge. Although many authentication protocols have been proposed in the literature during the past decade, most of them do not fulfill the IoT security and performance requirements. Furthermore, only a very small number of these protocols can be used in Thing-to-Thing (T2T) architectures, where Things autonomously authenticate each other without involving any human intervention. In this paper, we propose a novel lightweight T2T mutual authentication protocol (T2T-MAP) using PUFs (Physical Unclonable Functions). The protocol employs PUFs technology to allow each Thing to uniquely identify and authenticate itself in an IoT infrastructure by using the physical randomness of its circuitry. We design the protocol and perform a security analysis to show that it is secure against known attacks. Also, we prove the security of the protocol using a security protocol prover. Finally, we implement a prototype of the protocol on resource-constrained devices and then conduct a performance analysis to demonstrate that the protocol allows fast authentication, reasonable communication overhead, and low energy consumption.

24 May 2022 in IEEE Transactions on Aerospace and Electronic Systems
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
KLKarim Lounis
Karim Lounis
ZMZiad Mansour
Ziad Mansour
MWMichael Wrana
Michael Wrana
MEMarwa A. Elsayed
Marwa A. Elsayed
SDSteven H. H. Ding
Steven H. H. Ding
MZMohammad Zulkernine
Mohammad Zulkernine
MIL-STD-1553 has been used for the past four decades by the military as a standardized, reliable, and faulttolerant communication bus to provide connectivity between different embedded components in mission-critical military vehicles. The bus was designed with a great focus on reliability, responsiveness, and fault tolerance. However, its security aspects were an afterthought. Indeed, in the early ‘70s, the notion of cyberattacks was not ubiquitous as it is today. Attacking computerized systems located at very high altitudes was an inconceivable scenario for many people, including security engineers. With current developments in cybersecurity and telecommunication networks, security analysis of the MIL-STD-1553 bus reveals that the system is not immune from cyberattacks. The bus is vulnerable to many attacks that could seriously damage the entire system. Rebuilding the security of the MIL-STD-1553 from scratch is cost-prohibitive and a very complex, not scalable, and inflexible approach. A common alternative to embedding security to the existing system is the development of an intrusion detection system that can be added to MIL-STD-1553 bus with minimal cost. In this paper, we review and discuss some possible attack vectors on the MIL-STD-1553 bus. Then, we analyze the risk and consequences of each attack vector on a fighter jet. This review and analysis will provide security-engineers with a holistic overview of possible attacks and their related risk on the MILSTD- 1553 to better design an effective intrusion detection system.

31 October 2022 in ACM Transactions on Cyber-Physical Systems
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
MWMichael Maximilian Wrana
Michael Maximilian Wrana
MEMarwa Elsayed
Marwa Elsayed
KLKarim Lounis
Karim Lounis
ZMZiad Mansour
Ziad Mansour
SDSteven H. H. Ding
Steven H. H. Ding
MZMohammad Zulkernine
Mohammad Zulkernine
MIL-STD-1553 is a communication bus that has been used by many military avionics platforms, such as the F-15 and F-35 fighter jets, for almost 50 years. Recently, it has become clear that the lack of security on MIL-STD-1553 and the requirement for internet communication between planes has revealed numerous potential attack vectors for malicious parties. Prevention of these attacks by modernizing the MIL-STD-1553 is not practical due to the military applications and existing far-reaching installations of the bus. We present a software system that can simulate bus transmissions to create easy, replicable, and large datasets of MIL-STD-1553 communications. We also propose an intrusion detection system (IDS) that can identify anomalies and the precise type of attack using recurrent neural networks with a reinforcement learning true-skip data selection algorithm. Our IDS outperforms existing algorithms designed for MIL-STD-1553 in binary anomaly detection tasks while also performing attack classification and minimizing computational resource cost. Our simulator can generate more data with higher fidelity than existing methods and integrate attack scenarios with greater detail. Furthermore, the simulator and IDS can be combined to form a web-based attack-defense game.