Angelos Stavrou

Prof. Dr. Angelos Stavrou

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Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

25Years (2002-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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12 February 2015 in IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
CKConstantinos Kolias
Constantinos Kolias
GKGeorgios Kambourakis
Georgios Kambourakis
ASAngelos Stavrou
Angelos Stavrou
Stefanos GritzalisStefanos Gritzalis
Stefanos Gritzalis
Wi-Fi has become the de facto wireless technology for achieving short- to medium-range device connectivity. While early attempts to secure this technology have been proved inadequate in several respects, the current more robust security amendments will inevitably get outperformed in the future, too. In any case, several security vulnerabilities have been spotted in virtually any version of the protocol rendering the integration of external protection mechanisms a necessity. In this context, the contribution of this paper is multifold. First, it gathers, categorizes, thoroughly evaluates the most popular attacks on 802.11 and analyzes their signatures. Second, it offers a publicly available dataset containing a rich blend of normal and attack traffic against 802.11 networks. A quite extensive first-hand evaluation of this dataset using several machine learning algorithms and data features is also provided. Given that to the best of our knowledge the literature lacks such a rich and well-tailored dataset, it is anticipated that the results of the work at hand will offer a solid basis for intrusion detection in the current as well as next-generation wireless networks.

3 December 2012
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
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CSCharles Smutz
Charles Smutz
ASAngelos Stavrou
Angelos Stavrou

1 May 2008 in 2008 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP 2008)
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Conference Paper
Closed access
GCGabriela F. Cretu
Gabriela F. Cretu
ASAngelos Stavrou
Angelos Stavrou
MLMichael E. Locasto
Michael E. Locasto
SSSalvatore J. Stolfo
Salvatore J. Stolfo
AKAngelos D. Keromytis
Angelos D. Keromytis
The efficacy of anomaly detection (AD) sensors depends heavily on the quality of the data used to train them. Artificial or contrived training data may not provide a realistic view of the deployment environment. Most realistic data sets are dirty; that is, they contain a number of attacks or anomalous events. The size of these high-quality training data sets makes manual removal or labeling of attack data infeasible. As a result, sensors trained on this data can miss attacks and their variations. We propose extending the training phase of AD sensors (in a manner agnostic to the underlying AD algorithm) to include a sanitization phase. This phase generates multiple models conditioned on small slices of the training data. We use these "micro- models" to produce provisional labels for each training input, and we combine the micro-models in a voting scheme to determine which parts of the training data may represent attacks. Our results suggest that this phase automatically and significantly improves the quality of unlabeled training data by making it as "attack-free" and "regular" as possible in the absence of absolute ground truth. We also show how a collaborative approach that combines models from different networks or domains can further refine the sanitization process to thwart targeted training or mimicry attacks against a single site.

1 January 2016 in IEEE Security & Privacy
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Journal Article
Closed access
CKConstantinos Kolias
Constantinos Kolias
ASAngelos Stavrou
Angelos Stavrou
JVJeffrey Voas
Jeffrey Voas
IBIrena Bojanova
Irena Bojanova
RKRichard Kuhn
Richard Kuhn
The Internet of Things (IoT) encompasses a wide range of processes: sensing, computation, communication, time, context, and data, to name only a few. How do all of these function as a system when using commercially available components that can be purchased from anywhere and at a low cost, and with little or no component pedigree available? To provide some practical answers to the these questions, we purchased components and created a set of small use cases to see how it all interoperated. We additionally wanted to ask what this means in terms of security, given many reports warning that IoT often lacks security features. Said another way, what could we glean from buying cheap parts, creating our own use cases with them, and learning how to exploit the vulnerabilities of those off-the shelf parts? The answer is a lot.

1 June 2014 in Computer Communications
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
HWHuangxin Wang
Huangxin Wang
QJQuan Jia
Quan Jia
DFDan Fleck
Dan Fleck
WPWalter Powell
Walter Powell
FLFei Li
Fei Li
ASAngelos Stavrou
Angelos Stavrou

1 July 2013
Verified
Conference Paper
Closed access
QJQuan Jia
Quan Jia
KSKun Sun
Kun Sun
ASAngelos Stavrou
Angelos Stavrou
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks still pose a significant threat to critical infrastructure and Internet services alike. In this paper, we propose MOTAG, a moving target defense mechanism that secures service access for authenticated clients against flooding DDoS attacks. MOTAG employs a group of dynamic packet indirection proxies to relay data traffic between legitimate clients and the protected servers. Our design can effectively inhibit external attackers' attempts to directly bombard the network infrastructure. As a result, attackers will have to collude with malicious insiders in locating secret proxies and then initiating attacks. However, MOTAG can isolate insider attacks from innocent clients by continuously "moving" secret proxies to new network locations while shuffling client-to-proxy assignments. We develop a greedy shuffling algorithm to minimize the number of proxy re- allocations (shuffles) while maximizing attack isolation. Simulations are used to investigate MOTAG's effectiveness on protecting services of different scales against intensified DDoS attacks.