How do Chinese firms assess investment risk? I argue that major Chinese firms tend to invest in countries whose leaders they perceive as strong. However, their perception of a host country leader’s strength arises from a range of subjective and relational factors, including their party school socialization, Chinese state’s preferences for strong leaders, efforts by the host country regime to ‘sell’ the image of a strong leader, and information brokerage by Chinese think tanks. Thus, the path taken by Chinese firms cannot be fully explained by ‘objective’ measurable indicators such as policy bank financing or natural endowments; social relationships and norms are crucial too. There are also unintended consequences of investing in countries where they consider leaders to be strong. If the leader turns out to be weak, this ultimately increases the likelihood of cancellation of ongoing major Chinese projects. In contrast, if the leader is indeed strong, this strategy could result in pushback, leaving Chinese firms vulnerable to the leader’s whim to act against Chinese interests. To illustrate, I draw on elite interviews, contrasting Chinese investment in the Philippines under Arroyo (2001–2010) and Duterte (2016-), Malaysia under Najib (2009–2018), and Indonesia under Jokowi (2014-).
How do states pursue industrial policies in the context of China’s rise? Examining Indonesia and Malaysia’s mineral processing sectors, we argue that these countries illustrate two different pathways that states take to bolster their industrial policies. Indonesia has followed the leading sector strategy to increase domestic nickel processing capacity and decrease reliance on resource exports. Chinese firms and the Indonesian government built the Indonesia Morowali Industrial Park to house nickel smelters, fostering a new leading sector. Chinese capital in smelting follows what Albert Hirschman has called ‘intermediate investments’, maximising forward and backward linkages across the Indonesian economy. In contrast, Malaysia has followed the dual economy strategy, where semi-finished goods are imported and assembled into finished ones to be exported abroad. Chinese firms and the Malaysian government established the Malaysia–China Kuantan Industrial Park to import, process and export steel products. However, due to the dual economy strategy, the industrial park impairs the activities of domestic steelmaking companies and inhibits the potential build-up of smelting capacity. In sum, through an examination of an industrial park in each country, our paper connects the literatures on industrial policy and Chinese capital.
12 August 2020 in Environmental Policy and Governance
Under what conditions do global regulatory norms become domesticated in highly contentious policy areas like oil, gas, and mining sectors? Departing from norm diffusion and environmental politics scholarship, the paper draws from the sociological literature on “coalition‐building” to explain the partial, uneven adoption of global regulations aimed at setting standards for corporate behavior in the context of large‐scale mining. We process trace the variation in coalitional politics in the contemporary Philippine's mining regulatory framework through a within‐case comparison of mining policies under Arroyo (2001–2010), Aquino (2010–2016), and Duterte (2016‐present) governments. We argue that the successful inclusion of civil society and mining communities into policy‐making processes can substantively contribute toward mining policies that are acceptable to those who face the socio‐environmental consequences of resource exploitation. In contrast, highly narrow governing coalitions tend to fuel resistance and enhance political opposition vis‐à‐vis large‐scale mineral extraction.
3 July 2021 in Journal of the Asia Pacific Economy
We examine Chinese President Xi Jinping’s close relations with Malaysian Prime Minister Najib Razak (2009-2018) and Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte (2016-), an outcome of China’s Belt & Road Initiative (BRI). We argue strongmen use their political power, shaped by their own political-economic systems, to tap into the BRI’s available capital to fuel their political agendas. We illustrate this argument in Malaysia, a country with a centralized party system, and in the Philippines, one with an oligarchy-driven economy with decentralized political parties. In Malaysia, Najib was able to directly use BRI to generate economic rents, reward business allies, and dispense patronage through company directorships and subcontracts to party members to strengthen his political position. In contrast, the Philippines’ inherently coalitional system highlights the messiness as well as compromises in states with decentralized political competition. While Duterte is perceived to be an all-powerful autocrat, in reality he needs the support of major political elites, oligarchs, and local politicians for most major decisions. Duterte still used BRI to reward his cronies, weaken the opposition, and tame the oligarchs.