We explored the transmission mechanisms of corporate fraud and its punishments within social network communities. Using fraud triangle theory and trust triangle theory, we hypothesize four transmitting channels of how fraud commission and detection are affected by peers’ fraud and punishment. Based on Chinese listed corporations from 2008 to 2018, we first construct and detect interlocked social network communities with a community-detecting algorithm, and then examine hypotheses using a bivariate probit model with partial observability. Our findings indicate that peer-concealing and -hinting effects exist within social network communities. The peer-concealing effect decreases the likelihood of being detected when committing fraud, for those with more and closer fraudulent peers. The peer-hinting effect increases the likelihood of being detected when committing fraud, for those with more and closer punished peers. There is no evidence to support peer-contagion and vicarious-punishment effects. Thus, an improved understanding of the transmission mechanism of corporate fraud commission and detection within communities is provided to prevent and detect corporate fraud. In addition, stakeholders and regulators should be aware of the deviant subculture and social distancing in social network communities.

Combining the perspectives of upper echelon theory and institutional theory, we investigate how top managers’ sport experience exploits corporate environmental proactivity in China and embed this question into state ownership. With the sample of Chinese listing enterprises from 2008 to 2018, we find that both sport experience and state ownership positively promote corporate environmental proactivity, while state ownership crowds out the promotion of top managers’ sport experience. Further analyses show that position and financial experience of top manager as well as corporate investing efficiency and location matter in these processes. Thus, we extend the understanding of how top managers’ sport experience and state ownership interact and influence corporate environmental proactivity. We, therefore, provide new instruments to promote corporate environmental proactivity and, respectively, extend upper echelon theory from the perspective of top managers’ sport experience as well as institutional theory from the perspective of state ownership.