Maria Bigoni

Prof. Maria Bigoni

Department of Economics, University of Bologna, Bologna 40126, Italy
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Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

19Years (2008-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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19 June 2012 in The RAND Journal of Economics
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MBMaria Bigoni
Maria Bigoni
SFSven‐Olof Fridolfsson
Sven‐Olof Fridolfsson
CCChloé Le Coq
Chloé Le Coq
GSGiancarlo Spagnolo
Giancarlo Spagnolo

30 March 2016 in The Economic Journal
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Journal Article
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MBMaria Bigoni
Maria Bigoni
SBStefania Bortolotti
Stefania Bortolotti
MCMarco Casari
Marco Casari
DGDiego Gambetta
Diego Gambetta
FPFrancesca Pancotto
Francesca Pancotto
We present the first laboratory‐in‐the field experiment on the Italian North–South divide. Using a representative sample of the population, we measure

1 January 2015 in Econometrica
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Journal Article
Open access
MBMaria Bigoni
Maria Bigoni
MCMarco Casari
Marco Casari
ASAndrzej Skrzypacz
Andrzej Skrzypacz
GSGiancarlo Spagnolo
Giancarlo Spagnolo

26 August 2013 in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
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GCGabriele Camera
Gabriele Camera
MCMarco Casari
Marco Casari
MBMaria Bigoni
Maria Bigoni
What makes money essential for the functioning of modern society? Through an experiment, we present evidence for the existence of a relevant behavioral dimension in addition to the standard theoretical arguments. Subjects faced repeated opportunities to help an anonymous counterpart who changed over time. Cooperation required trusting that help given to a stranger today would be returned by a stranger in the future. Cooperation levels declined when going from small to large groups of strangers, even if monitoring and payoffs from cooperation were invariant to group size. We then introduced intrinsically worthless tokens. Tokens endogenously became money: subjects took to reward help with a token and to demand a token in exchange for help. Subjects trusted that strangers would return help for a token. Cooperation levels remained stable as the groups grew larger. In all conditions, full cooperation was possible through a social norm of decentralized enforcement, without using tokens. This turned out to be especially demanding in large groups. Lack of trust among strangers thus made money behaviorally essential. To explain these results, we developed an evolutionary model. When behavior in society is heterogeneous, cooperation collapses without tokens. In contrast, the use of tokens makes cooperation evolutionarily stable.

6 March 2015 in The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization
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Journal Article
Closed access
MBMaria Bigoni
Maria Bigoni
SFS.-O. Fridolfsson
S.-O. Fridolfsson
CCC. Le Coq
C. Le Coq
GSG. Spagnolo
G. Spagnolo

1 July 2012 in Games and Economic Behavior
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Journal Article
Closed access
GCGabriele Camera
Gabriele Camera
MCMarco Casari
Marco Casari
MBMaria Bigoni
Maria Bigoni