Les leurres conversationnels sont des agents artificiels qui, une fois insérés au sein d’échanges langagiers, sont susceptibles de passer pour des humains. Ils se distinguent donc des robots et autres agents incarnés par leur capacité à leurrer des interactants humains en situation. Apparus à la naissance du projet de l’Intelligence Artificielle dans le Jeu de l’Imitation d’Alan Turing (appelé aussi test de Turing), les leurres conversationnels ont été ensuite développés dans des directions différentes, dont nous proposons une première généalogie. Les modalités de la conception des leurres (des professionnels de l’informatique y croisent des amateurs éclairés) diffèrent, de même que leurs usages : répondre à des interrogations épistémiques, gérer une consultation de psychologie non directive, répondre à des appels non sollicités de télémarketing. Dans cet article, nous montrons l’intérêt d’adopter une approche configurationnelle pour étudier les trois principaux types de leurres conversationnels, les différents contextes langagiers au sein desquels ils interviennent et comment ils parviennent à se glisser dans la texture intelligible des interactions, en vue de réaliser différentes fins pratiques.
17 November 2016 in Journal of Cryptographic Engineering
The goal of this chapter is to introduce the reader to the domain of bug discovery in embedded systems which are at the core of the Internet of Things. Embedded software has a number of particularities which makes it slightly different to general purpose software. In particular, embedded devices are more exposed to software attacks but have lower defense levels and are often left unattended. At the same time, analyzing their security is more difficult because they are very “opaque”, while the execution of custom and embedded software is often entangled with the hardware and peripherals. These differences have an impact on our ability to find software bugs in such systems. This chapter discusses how software vulnerabilities can be identified, at different stages of the software life-cycle, for example during development, during integration of the different components, during testing, during the deployment of the device, or in the field by third parties.
Smartphones, the devices we carry everywhere with us, are being heavily tracked and have undoubtedly become a major threat to our privacy. As "tracking the trackers" has become a necessity, various static and dynamic analysis tools have been developed in the past. However, today, we still lack suitable tools to detect, measure and compare the ongoing tracking across mobile OSs. To this end, we propose MobileAppScrutinator, based on a simple yet efficient dynamic analysis approach, that works on both Android and iOS (the two most popular OSs today). To demonstrate the current trend in tracking, we select 140 most representative Apps available on both Android and iOS AppStores and test them with MobileAppScrutinator. In fact, choosing the same set of apps on both Android and iOS also enables us to compare the ongoing tracking on these two OSs. Finally, we also discuss the effectiveness of privacy safeguards available on Android and iOS. We show that neither Android nor iOS privacy safeguards in their present state are completely satisfying.