Corporatization in the public sector entails decentralizing the provision of public goods and services to more autonomous entities, including state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Research indicates that the decision to corporatize is driven, among other factors, by the pursuit of financial sustainability in public organizations. A continuing debate revolves around whether the political ideology of incumbents is linked to the creation of SOEs. However, limited attention has been given to understanding if incumbents’ ideology shapes SOEs’ financial performance and, hence, financial sustainability. This is concerning because SOEs operate beyond political cycles, facing pressures from ideologically different governments over time. Herein, we investigate whether the incumbents’ ideologies shape SOEs’ financial performance. We hypothesize that the more right leaning the incumbent, the greater the SOEs’ financial performance. However, given that incumbents’ decisions are influenced by their political parties’ behaviors, the effects of ideology may be contingent on these factors. Thus, we investigate whether the association of incumbents’ ideology with SOEs’ financial performance is weaker when incumbents’ political parties display non-policy behaviors (e.g., by prioritizing electoral outcomes or office occupation). We analyze a 2019–2022 panel of 317 SOEs controlled by 27 subnational governments in Brazil with both FGLS and instrumental variable regression approaches. The data comprising 1,116 SOE-year observations confirm our hypotheses. Our research contributes to scholarship on the drivers of public organizations’ financial performance and sheds light on the role of political contingencies, such as incumbents’ ideology and party predominant behaviors regarding SOEs’ financial performance—a commonly overlooked gap in current research.
A robust body of research suggests that entrepreneurial activities benefit from financial development and external financing access. However, there is a gap in understanding how and the extent to which the accessibility to financial services is associated with entrepreneurial activity. Based on an unbalanced panel of 2104 Brazilian municipalities spanning 2010–2021 and comprising 23,769 municipality-year observations, our results not only confirm that bank accessibility, proxied by the number of bank branches in a municipality, is positively correlated with the number of firms but also that the relationship is nonlinear, being stronger for larger firms. By estimating a model using first differences, we find a positive causal impact of an additional bank branch on the number of firms in a municipality of 0.2% (about 26 extra firms on average). Our study contributes to the literature by corroborating that access to external financing services shapes entrepreneurial activities.
The extent to which Regulatory Impact Assessments (RIAs) conform to the “ideal” rational decision‐making model depends on factors such as political appropriation and the capacity of regulatory bodies. However, despite RIAs being embedded in bureaucratic settings, little research examines how the degree of formalization of RIA implementation affects their quality. In many contexts, RIAs are implemented within decision‐making environments characterized by bureaucratization, where discretion is constrained by legalism, formal boundaries, and standardized processes. This study investigates how bureaucratization influences RIA quality and whether regulators socialized in more bureaucratized administrative cultures rely more heavily on standardized procedures than their peers, thereby affecting RIA quality. Drawing on evidence from Brazilian regulatory agencies that operate within a traditionally bureaucratized administrative system, we employ a mixed‐methods design that combines OLS regression analysis with qualitative interviews. Our findings show that lower bureaucratization, operationalized as the use of strategic guidance documents that convey essential concepts and outline decision‐making steps, is associated with higher‐quality RIAs. By contrast, higher bureaucratization, characterized by the adoption of overly standardized templates, diminishes impact assessment quality. In addition, regulatory boards composed primarily of public sector professionals tend to adopt these templates more frequently, further reinforcing lower quality RIAs. Overall, the study contributes to research on the determinants of RIA quality and demonstrates how excessive bureaucratization can displace the intended goals of policy instruments.