Charles Barbour

Dr. Charles Barbour


Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

17Years (2010-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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31 October 2012 in Theory, Culture & Society
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CBCharles Barbour
Charles Barbour
Georg Simmel’s treatment of the lie – in the essay ‘The Sociology of Secrecy and Secret Societies’, but in other, lesser known texts as well – is an aspect of his thought that has not received a great deal of attention among theorists. And yet many of his better known contributions to social theory – including his concepts of ‘interaction’ and ‘sociation’, his appreciation of the spatial and the aesthetic dimensions of social life, and his speculations about culture and subjectivity in the modern world – draw on ideas that he developed while contemplating the problem of deception. In this article, I bring Simmel’s work on mendacity to the fore, and show how a consideration of it sheds new light on some of his most familiar claims. I further argue that Simmel’s work on the lie illuminates a very old and vexing set of philosophical debates, and especially the debate over self-deception, or whether or not it is possible to lie to oneself. Along with providing a close study of his comments on the lie in ‘The Sociology of Secrecy and Secret Societies’, and in the chapter of his monumental Sociology that is based on that essay, I propose a reading of Simmel’s heretofore ignored fable or fairytale ‘Der Lügenmacher’ – one of the eight short pieces that he published pseudonymously between 1899 and 1903 in the cultural journal Der Jugend under the heading ‘Momentbilder’ or ‘Snapshots, sub specie aeternitatis’.

22 July 2012 in International Journal for the Semiotics of Law - Revue internationale de Sémiotique juridique
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CBCharles Barbour
Charles Barbour

26 April 2011 in Philosophy & Social Criticism
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CBCharles Barbour
Charles Barbour
In a brief comment in ‘History of the Lie’, his one sustained engagement with Arendt, Derrida criticizes the ‘absence’ of any reference to the ‘problematic of testimony, witnessing, or bearing witness’ in her work, and asserts that she was ‘not interested’ in what ‘distinguishes’ testimony from ‘proof’. This passage links Derrida’s reading of Arendt to a theme that concerns him throughout his later work, specifically the ‘affirmation’ or ‘act of faith’ that ostensibly conditions all human relations, and the possibility of sociality in general. In this article, I claim not only that Arendt did address the problem of testimony or witnessing, and the difference between bearing witness and establishing proof, but also that her consideration of these issues represents an alternative to many of the arguments Derrida develops in his later work, especially his approach to responsibility and judgment, secrecy and memory, and the relation between the self and others.


16 April 2010 in Law, Culture and the Humanities
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CBCharles Barbour
Charles Barbour
Contemporary understandings of sovereignty have generally followed, or borrowed heavily from, Carl Schmitt’s theory of the exception, which Giorgio Agamben refers to as a “topological” concept. Schmitt conceives of the sovereign as a figure who exists both inside and outside of the juridical order. This paper suggests that Schmitt’s theory of the sovereign exception involves not only a topology, but also a temporality, in that it treats the decision as a single, compacted instant — one in which crisis, decision, and decider all miraculously leap into existence. It further suggests that Agamben’s interpretation of Saint Paul’s “ho nyn kairos” or “time of the now,” and his distinction between the prophet and the apostle, effectively reinforces the Schmittian conception of “sovereign time.” As an alternative, I refer to Jacques Derrida’s work on iteration and undecidability, and maintain that genuine decisions cast us into, rather than delivering us from, the aproias of time.

15 February 2013 in Societies
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CBCharles Barbour
Charles Barbour
This paper takes up the question of secrecy and sovereignty in Derrida’s final seminar on The Beast and the Sovereign. Focusing primarily on Derrida’s readings of Lacan and Celan in Volume I, it argues that, for Derrida, we should distinguish between the lie (or what Lacan calls ‘trickery’ or ‘feigning feint’), and the secret (or what Celan calls ‘the secret of an encounter’), and understand the sense in which the former implies an intentional and sovereign human subject, while the latter represents a limit to such a thing, and, arguably, to the concept of sovereignty as such. This explains, or helps explain, why, in his discussions of sovereignty, Derrida spends so much time examining the animal, on the one hand, and poetry, on the other. For, on his account, these both configure secrecy, and specifically what I refer to as the absolute secret.