Stephan Leuenberger

Dr. Stephan Leuenberger


Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

19Years (2008-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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26 November 2013 in Inquiry
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SLStephan Leuenberger
Stephan Leuenberger
The elucidations and regimentations of grounding offered in the literature standardly take it to be a necessary connection. In particular, authors often assert, or at least assume, that if some facts ground another fact, then the obtaining of the former necessitates the latter; and moreover, that grounding is an internal relation, in the sense of being necessitated by the existence of the relata. In this article, I challenge the necessitarian orthodoxy about grounding by offering two prima facie counterexamples. First, some physical facts may ground a certain phenomenal fact without necessitating it; and they may co-exist with the latter without grounding it. Second, some instantiations of categorical properties may ground the instantiation of a dispositional one without necessitating it; and they may co-exist without grounding it. After arguing that these may be genuine counterexamples, I ask whether there are modal constraints on grounding that are not threatened by them. I propose two: that grounding supervenes on what facts there are, and that every grounded fact supervenes on what grounds there are. Finally, I attempt to provide a rigorous formulation of the latter supervenience claim and discuss some technical questions that arise if we allow descending grounding chains of transfinite length.

14 August 2019 in Philosophical Studies
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SLStephan Leuenberger
Stephan Leuenberger
Fundamentality plays a pivotal role in discussions of ontology, supervenience, and possibility, and other key topics in metaphysics. However, there are two different ways of characterising the fundamental: as that which is not grounded, and as that which is the ground of everything else. I show that whether these two characterisations pick out the same property turns on a principle—which I call “Dichotomy”—that is of independent interest in the theory of ground: that everything is either fully grounded or not even partially grounded. I then argue that Dichotomy fails: some facts have partial grounds that cannot be complemented to a full ground. Rejecting Dichotomy opens the door to recognising a bifurcation in our notion of fundamentality. I sketch some of the far-reaching metaphysical consequences this might have, with reference to big-picture views such as Humeanism. Since Dichotomy is entailed by the standard account of partial ground, according to which partial grounds are subpluralities of full grounds, a non-standard account is needed. In a technical “Appendix”, I show that truthmaker semantics furnishes such an account, and identify a semantic condition that corresponds to Dichotomy.

27 April 2013 in Erkenntnis
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SLStephan Leuenberger
Stephan Leuenberger

1 July 2008 in Synthese
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SLStephan Leuenberger
Stephan Leuenberger

21 July 2008 in Philosophy Compass
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SLStephan Leuenberger
Stephan Leuenberger

1 March 2014 in The Review of Symbolic Logic
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SLStephan Leuenberger
Stephan Leuenberger
A typical first stab at explicating the thesis of physicalism is this: physicalism is true iff every fact about the world is entailed by the conjunction of physical facts. The same holds, mutatis mutandis, for other hypotheses about the fundamental nature of our world. But it has been recognized that this would leave such hypotheses without the fighting chance that they deserve: certain negative truths, like the truth (if it is one) that there are no angels, are not entailed by the physical facts, but nonetheless do not threaten physicalism. A plausible remedy that has been suggested by Jackson and Chalmers is that physicalism boils down to the thesis that every truth is entailed by the conjunction of the physical facts prefixed by a “that’s it” or “totality” operator. To evaluate this suggestion, we need to know what that operator means, and—since the truth of physicalism hinges on what is entailed by a totality claim—what its logic is. That is, we need to understand the logic of totality, or total logic. In this paper, I add a totality operator to the language of propositional logic and present a model theory for it, building on a suggestion by Chalmers and Jackson. I then prove determination results for a number of different systems.