Robert Barnard

Dr. Robert Barnard

orcid

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

18Years (2009-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

View All Publications
27 June 2013 in Review of Philosophy and Psychology
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
PDF file
RBRobert Barnard
Robert Barnard
Joseph UlatowskiJoseph Ulatowski
Joseph Ulatowski

20 August 2015 in Erkenntnis
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
PDF file
RBRobert Barnard
Robert Barnard
Joseph UlatowskiJoseph Ulatowski
Joseph Ulatowski

8 November 2017 in Synthese
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
PDF file
RBRobert Barnard
Robert Barnard
Joseph UlatowskiJoseph Ulatowski
Joseph Ulatowski

3 December 2021 in Filozofia Nauki
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
RBRobert Barnard
Robert Barnard
Joseph UlatowskiJoseph Ulatowski
Joseph Ulatowski
JWJonathan M. Weinberg
Jonathan M. Weinberg
The time has come to consider whether experimental philosophy’s (“x-phi”) early arguments, debates, and conceptual frameworks, that may have worn well in its early days, fit with the diverse range of projects undertaken by experimental philosophers. Our aim is to propose a novel taxonomy for x-phi that identifies four paths from empirical findings to philosophical consequences, which we call the “fourfold route.” We show how this taxonomy can be fruitfully applied even at what one might have taken to be the furthest edges of possible applications of x-phi in metaphysics and formal philosophy. Ultimately, the fourfold route helps us understand a different kind of empirical fact: the development of x-phi itself.

1 January 2013 in Southwest Philosophy Review
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
RBRobert Barnard
Robert Barnard
SSSouthwestern Philosophical Society
Southwestern Philosophical Society

24 August 2009 in Analysis
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
PDF file
RBRobert Barnard
Robert Barnard
Dyke's titular fallacy is no simple logical error. Instead, we commit the representational fallacy when we reason metaphysically from the supposition that a descriptive sentence is true to the consequence that reality must be as the description claims; the fallacy results from embracing a mistaken assumption about the relationship between language and reality: the Strong Linguistic Thesis (SLT). SLT holds that there is ‘a privileged true description of reality, the sentences of which (a) stand in a one-to-one correspondence with facts in the world, and (b) are structurally isomorphic to the facts with which they correspond’ (7). The book has two complementary aims: (i) to demonstrate that there is broad commitment to SLT, and (ii) to show that we would be better off metaphysically rejecting SLT.