The ability to infer mental and affective states of others is crucial for social functioning. This ability, denoted as Theory of Mind (ToM), develops rapidly during childhood, yet results on its development across adolescence and into young adulthood are rare. In the present study, we tested the two‐component model, measuring age‐related changes in social‐perceptual and social‐cognitive ToM in a sample of 267 participants between 11 and 25 years of age. Additionally, we measured language, reasoning, and inhibitory control as major covariates. Participants inferred mental states from non‐verbal cues in a social‐perceptual task (Eye Test) and from stories with faux pas in a social‐cognitive task (Faux Pas Test). Results showed substantial improvement across adolescence in both ToM measures and in the covariates. Analysis with linear mixed models (LMM) revealed specific age‐related growth for the social‐perceptual component, while the age‐related increase of the social‐cognitive component fully aligned with the increase of the covariates. These results support the distinction between ToM components and indicate that adolescence is a crucial period for developing social‐perceptual ToM abilities. Statement of contribution: What is already known on this subject? To date, much research has been dedicated to Theory of Mind (ToM) development in early and middle childhood. However, only a few studies have examined development of ToM in adolescence. Studies so far suggest age‐related differences in ToM between adolescents and young adults. What this study adds The study offers several methodological advantages including a large sample size with a continuous distribution of age (age 11–25) and the use of a comprehensive test battery to assess ToM and covariates (language, executive functions, reasoning). The results provide evidence for asymmetries in the development of two ToM components (social‐perceptual and social‐cognitive; the two‐component account) across the studied age range: the social perceptual component showed specific development, while the age‐related increase of the social‐cognitive component fully aligned with increase of the covariates. Adolescence is a crucial period for developing social‐perceptual ToM abilities.

According to the two-systems account of theory of mind (ToM), understanding mental states of others involves both fast social-perceptual processes, as well as slower, reflexive cognitive operations (Frith and Frith, 2008; Apperly and Butterfill, 2009). To test the respective roles of specific abilities in either of these processes we administered 15 experimental procedures to a large sample of 343 participants, testing ability in face recognition and holistic perception, language, and reasoning. ToM was measured by a set of tasks requiring ability to track and to infer complex emotional and mental states of others from faces, eyes, spoken language, and prosody. We used structural equation modeling to test the relative strengths of a social-perceptual (face processing related) and reflexive-cognitive (language and reasoning related) path in predicting ToM ability. The two paths accounted for 58% of ToM variance, thus validating a general two-systems framework. Testing specific predictor paths revealed language and face recognition as strong and significant predictors of ToM. For reasoning, there were neither direct nor mediated effects, albeit reasoning was strongly associated with language. Holistic face perception also failed to show a direct link with ToM ability, while there was a mediated effect via face recognition. These results highlight the respective roles of face recognition and language for the social brain, and contribute closer empirical specification of the general two-systems account.