This research explored the strategic beliefs that people have about science and the extent to which it can explain moral and immoral behaviors. Although people do not believe that science is able to explain certain aspects of their mind, they might nevertheless accept a scientific explanation for their immoral behaviors if that explanation is exculpatory. In a first study, participants reflected on moral and immoral deeds that they performed or that other people performed. Participants were somewhat skeptic that science can account for people’s behavior— except for when they reflected on the wrongdoings that they committed. Two further studies suggest that strategic belief in science arises because it enables external attributions for the behavior, outside of the wrongdoers’ control. Implications are discussed for science understanding and communication.
Though people readily claim that others fall prey to several biases, they are less likely to recognize those same biases in themselves – a tendency termed bias blind spot (Pronin et al. in Personality Social Psychol Bull 23:369–381, 2002). The bias blind spot is believed to emerge due to people’s overreliance on introspection for assessing their biases (which is unlikely to turn up evidence of bias), while bias in other people is ascribed based on their behaviors. Many biases, however, are perceived as negative and thus the bias blind spot may reflect the desire to see oneself in a positive light. Moreover, not all biases are necessarily undesirable, and thus people may be motivated to admit to biases that are considered desirable. We explore this motivational account for the bias blind spot by manipulating bias desirability within- and across-biases. Participants report a smaller bias blind spot after reading a bias description that focuses on its positive outcomes, relative to when the same description details its negative consequences (Study 1). We obtain convergent evidence when considering perceptions of bias desirability (Study 2): The more a person rates a bias as desirable, the less bias blind spot they report for it. Implications are discussed with regard to what constitutes an adaptative bias – namely that a bias can be considered an error from the logical standpoint and nevertheless be socially advantageous and thus adaptive.
1 October 2020 in Attention, Perception, & Psychophysics
Faces and words are ever-present stimuli in social environments that require fine-grained, efficient discrimination of their constituents in order to acquire meaning. Provided that these stimuli share multiple characteristics, while simultaneously being different visual object categories in important ways, a debate has ensued pertaining to whether their processing can be reduced to a common mechanism or whether each category mobilizes exclusive resources. We thus first present briefly domain-specific and domain-general accounts, as opposing perspectives that highlight the absence and presence of commonalities in face and word processing, respectively. We then focus on how faces and words are processed. While faces are usually associated with holistic processing of facial features, to create a perceptual whole, there is no such consensus pertaining to word processing. Words have been argued to rely on either letter-by-letter processing or in a way closer to that of faces, since they are also objects of expertise. Lastly, we advance the debate by providing an overview of our latest research findings. These findings provide a more direct comparison of face and word processing, by incorporating both stimuli in one task concurrently.