This article is an empirical study of characteristics related to residential properties sold in Sydney, Australia. We use comprehensive data on the Sydney housing market composed of 25 489 observations for properties sold in the Sydney region in 2011. We consider the fact that both the seller of the property and the real estate agent have a common goal: to sell the property at the highest possible price in the shortest amount of time. The analysis is divided into two major parts. First, we estimate a two-stage least square model to analyse which parameters affect time on the market for a property. Second, we propose a probit model that estimates the parameters that affect a revision in list prices. The results contribute to the existing literature on the Australian housing market by extending understandings about the parameters that could affect the time on the market of properties and the revision of their list prices.
In this paper, we examine the usefulness of time commitment as a voting resource for decentralized governance when the identity of voters cannot be verified. In order to do so, we take a closer look at two issues that confront token-based voting systems used by blockchain communities and organizations: voter fraud through the creation of multiple identities (Sybil attack) and concentration of voting power in the hands of the wealthy (plutocracy). Our contribution is threefold: first, we lay analytical foundations for the formal modeling of the necessary and sufficient conditions for a voting system to be resistant to a Sybil attack; second, we show that tokens as the only instrument for weighting votes cannot simultaneously achieve resistance to both Sybil attacks and a plutocracy in the voting process; and third, we design a voting mechanism, bond voting, that is Sybil resistant and offers a second instrument (time commitment) that is effective for countering plutocracy when large token holders also have a relatively high opportunity cost of locking tokens for a vote. Overall, our paper emphasizes the importance of time-based suffrage in decentralized governance. This paper was accepted by Joshua Gans, business strategy. Funding: This work was supported by Gitcoin (Using commitment voting for better DAO governance) and the Australian Research Council [Grant DP200101808].
Non-fungible tokens (NFTs) on blockchains have recently emerged as a means of certifying the originality of digital properties, such as artwork. In this paper we examine limited-edition auctions for the sale of digital artwork using NFTs. We present a new auction model for selling multiple units of homogeneous goods that are ranked through editioning. We argue that the limited-edition auction as currently used is a type of the well-known discriminatory auction. We derive the Bayesian Nash equilibrium of this auction, and show that it is revenue equivalent to a VCG auction. Our analysis suggests that bidding behavior in a limited-edition auction is more aggressive than a standard discriminatory auction without editioning; consequently, equilibrium bids are higher in the former. We also study the uniform-price auction as an alternative mechanism for conducting an auction with editioning, and establish that such an auction would have no truthful equilibrium. Our paper represents one of the first attempts to formally model the allocation of property rights in the digital environment which is at the forefront of current innovation.