This paper presents a simple game theoretic framework, assuming complete information, to model Bitcoin mining activity. It does so by formalizing the activity as an all-pay contest: a competition where participants contend with each other to win a prize by investing in computational power, and victory is probabilistic. With at least two active miners, the unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium of the game suggests the following interesting insights on the motivation for being a miner: while the optimal amount of energy consumption depends also on the reward for solving the puzzle, as long as the reward is positive the decision to be an active miner depends only on the mining costs. Moreover, the intrinsic structure of the mining activity seems to prevent the formation of a monopoly, because in an equilibrium with two miners, both of them will have positive expected profits for any level of the opponent’s costs. A monopoly could only form if the rate of return on investment were higher outside bitcoin.
An arms race for an artificial general intelligence (AGI) would be detrimental for and even pose an existential threat to humanity if it results in an unfriendly AGI. In this paper, an all-pay contest model is developed to derive implications for public policy to avoid such an outcome. It is established that, in a winner-takes-all race, where players must invest in R&D, only the most competitive teams will participate. Thus, given the difficulty of AGI, the number of competing teams is unlikely ever to be very large. It is also established that the intention of teams competing in an AGI race, as well as the possibility of an intermediate outcome (prize), is important. The possibility of an intermediate prize will raise the probability of finding the dominant AGI application and, hence, will make public control more urgent. It is recommended that the danger of an unfriendly AGI can be reduced by taxing AI and using public procurement. This would reduce the pay-off of contestants, raise the amount of R&D needed to compete, and coordinate and incentivize co-operation. This will help to alleviate the control and political problems in AI. Future research is needed to elaborate the design of systems of public procurement of AI innovation and for appropriately adjusting the legal frameworks underpinning high-tech innovation, in particular dealing with patenting by AI.
The economics of cloud computing has recently attracted increasing attention. In particular, a topic which is still under debate is how prices charged to customers for cloud resources are formed, since alternative pricing rules could be considered. Based on three pricing schemes inspired by those used by Amazon EC2, the main global cloud service provider, in the paper we address two main issues. First we present a methodology for the relevant parameters of the pricing rules to be determined in an optimal way, that is to maximise the provider’s revenue. Moreover, we discuss reasons for co-existence of three pricing rules, rather than fewer, to access the cloud. Our findings suggest that this may be due to a larger coverage of the potential demand, since customers applying for cloud services vary in their willingness to pay for the job, the time length of the service, the computational power requested etc. Furthermore, the pricing rule in the so-called, spot market, can provide the platform with useful information on the customers willingness to pay for cloud services. This is because in the spot market users offer a price for service, but pay less than that if their request is satisfied.
Governance in blockchain platforms is an increasingly important topic. A particular concern related to voting procedures is the formation of dominant positions, which may discourage participation of minorities. A main feature of standard majority voting is that individuals can indicate their preferences but cannot express the intensity of their preferences. This could sometimes be a drawback for minorities who may not have the opportunity to obtain their most desirable outcomes, even when such outcomes are particularly important for them. For this reason a voting method, which in recent years gained visibility, is quadratic voting (QV), which allows voters to manifest both their preferences and the associated intensity. In voting rounds, where in each round users express their preference over binary alternatives, what characterizes QV is that the sum of the squares of the votes allocated by individuals to each round has to be equal to the total number, budget, of available votes. That is, the cost associated with a number of votes is given by the square of that number, hence it increases quadratically. In the paper, we discuss QV in proof-of-stake-based blockchain platforms, where a user’s monetary stake also represents the budget of votes available in a voting session. Considering the stake as given, the work focuses mostly on a game theoretic approach to determine the optimal allocation of votes across the rounds. We also investigate the possibility of the so-called Sybil attacks and discuss how simultaneous versus sequential staking can affect the voting outcomes with QV.
Confirmation of Bitcoin transactions is executed in blocks, which are then stored in the Blockchain. As compared to the number of transactions in the mempool, the set of transactions which are verified but not yet confirmed, available space for inclusion in a block is typically limited. For this reason, successful miners can only process a subset of such transactions, and users compete with each other to enter the next block by offering confirmation fees. Assuming that successful miners pursue revenue maximization, they will include in the block those mempool transactions that maximize earnings from related fees. In the paper we model transaction fees as a Nash Equilibrium outcome of an auction game with complete information. In the game the successful miner acts as an auctioneer selling block space, and users bid for shares of such space to confirm their transactions. Moreover, based on expected fees we also discuss what the optimal, revenue maximizing, block size limit should be for the successful miner. Consistently with the intuition, the optimal block size limit resolves the trade-off between including additional transactions (which possibly lower the unit fees collected) and keeping the block capacity limited (with, however, higher unit fees).
31 December 2011 in Trends in Pharmacological Sciences