The deployment of new technologies, the importance of accurately modeling the dynamics of the generating units and the introduction of new policies are making the solution of the Unit Commitment/Economic Dispatch problem more and more complicated.In the present scenario, traditionally followed scheduling criteria might not lead to the optimal fleet configuration any more. In addition, most of the widely used techniques have limited capabilities at modeling the nonlinear dynamics of committed power plants. When realistic power systems comprising of several tens of generating units are modeled, the resulting optimization problem turns to be computationally intensive for the current computing capabilities. In this paper, an improved version of a GA-based optimization algorithm is presented. A detailed methodology aimed at obtaining a more efficient version of the GA, and a more detailed and accurate description of the flexible operation flexibility of the power plants is described.

This work explores the technical challenges associated with flexible operation for nuclear power plants (NPPs) and evaluates whether a flexible operational mode could improve the profitability of nuclear units by allowing nuclear plant owners/operators to reduce output when prices are low and instead shift capacity to the ancillary services markets. As compared to conventional power plants, NPP flexible operation capabilities are affected by additional physics-induced constraints. Among the most limiting constraints is the negative reactivity insertion following every reactor power drop due to the increased concentration of xenon, a strong neutron poison. In this work, a previously available power system operation model based on mixed-integer linear programming optimization was improved by implementing a dedicated representation of these physics-induced constraints for pressurized water reactors (PWRs). Because the xenon-related constraint involves nonlinear governing dynamics, a dedicated parametric approach was implemented. To evaluate the economic implications of flexible PWR operation, a case study using realistic power system data representative of the southwestern United States was analyzed. The results indicate that flexible operation can increase the revenue of nuclear units while at the same time reducing total electric system operating costs.

The interaction of the active control system with passive safety behavior is investigated for sodium-cooled fast reactors. A claim often made of advanced reactors is that they are passively safe against unprotected upset events. In practice, such upset events are not analyzed in the context of the plant control system, but rather the analyses are performed without considering the normally programmed response of the control system (open-loop approach). This represents an oversimplification of the safety case. The issue of passive safety override arises since the control system commands actuators whose motions have safety consequences. Depending on the upset involving the control system (operator error, active control system failure, or inadvertent control system override), an actuator does not necessarily go in the same direction as needed for safety. So neglecting to account for control system action during an unprotected upset is nonconservative from a safety standpoint. It is important then, during the design of the plant, to consider the potential for the control system to work against the inherent and safe regulating effects of purposefully engineered temperature feedbacks.

Advanced reactors are often claimed to be passively safe against unprotected upset events. In common practice, these events are not considered in the context of the plant control system, i.e., the reactor is subjected to classes of unprotected upset events while the normally programmed response of the control system is assumed not to be present. However, this approach constitutes an oversimplification since, depending on the upset involving the control system, an actuator does not necessarily go in the same direction as needed for safety. In this work, dynamic simulations are performed to assess the degree to which the inherent self-regulating plant response is safe from active control system override. The simulations are meant to characterize the resilience of the plant to unprotected initiators. The initiators were represented and modeled as an actuator going to a hard limit. Consideration of failure is further limited to individual controllers as there is no cross-connect of signals between these controllers. The potential for passive safety override by the control system is then relegated to the single-input single-output controllers. The results show that when the plant control system is designed by taking into account and quantifying the impact of the plant control system on accidental scenarios there is very limited opportunity for the preprogrammed response of the control system to override passive safety protection in the event of an unprotected initiator.