According to the idea of safety structures as systemic, we developed a framework that emphasizes how the engagement of all relevant social agents could play an active role in the whole safety performance. The hypothesis of this paper is that a systemic approach should imply a precise shift of perspective from a unit of analysis embedded in a general environment, with mutual effects on a given safety performance, to a general analysis of a system where interdependent agents affect system performance. Through the lens of organizational field theory, safety performance is intended as the sum of the activities of multi-agents oriented by normative and cultural principles set out at the societal level, specifically within the urban area boundaries. In doing so, the analysis describes the key agents and their activities according to four different safety stages: Prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery. Institutional logics, distinguished as formal and informal, help to explain the behaviors and connections among agents. With the idea that a locally placed, organizational field reflects its peculiarity, we used four Italian towns located in two different areas of Campania, which live under the constant risk of a volcanic eruption, as examples. The results show how safety structures systems are contextual, characterized by locally embedded formal and informal rules, but not necessarily mutually aimed at orienting key agents to improve the safety performance. This contribution aims to support empirical analyses, natural experiments as well as qualitative studies to compare urban areas designed as safety-organizational fields from a multidisciplinary perspective. At the same time, we indicate some policy suggestions by emphasizing differences among organizational fields.

Purpose: This paper analyses emergency management in two regions of Italy – Emilia-Romagna and Veneto – in order (1) to understand whether they impact on the spread of local coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) contagion and (2) evaluate which strategy works best.Design/methodology/approach: A three-step method was developed consisting of (1) a regional incidence curve analysis; (2) a descriptive statistical analysis of the respective operational measures related to the COVID-19 curve stages; and (3) a dynamic Structural Equation Model.Findings: The results show the effects of the models during the various stages of the local contagion, focussing both on the two individual regions and a comparison of the way they responded.Practical implications: Three theoretical implications are highlighted: (1) Better results are not necessarily the outcome of increased expenditure; (2) The overall rigidity they both show does not work; (3) The decision to centralize was, to some extent, effective for both regions.Originality/value: The article empirically tests the effectiveness of emergency management in tackling a single event. Instead of the widely-used normative approach, the authors adopted a descriptive one, which is not frequently discussed in the emergency management literature.

The aim of this study is to analyse inter-firm corruption and to ascertain whether the proximity of firms engaged in corruption is a significant factor. We draw on transaction cost theory to explore two forms of corrupt exchange (negotiated vs. productive) and the role of proximity in reducing transaction costs. We obtained original data from the judgements of the Italian Court of Cassation and clustered homogeneous proximities. We then used separate binomial logistic regressions to show how the relation between transaction properties, the consequences for transaction costs and forms of corrupt exchange lead to different outcomes for each subgroup of proximities. The results show that technological and geographical proximity are beneficial to both forms of exchange, leading to a reduction in exchange costs, in much the same way as legal activities. However, unlike legal exchanges, corrupt and in particular productive exchanges do not appear to benefit from social proximity.

This study examines why citizens re-elect corrupt mayors, adopting a conceptual framework that considers two mitigating factors in punishing corrupt leaders: first, a strong relationship between the mayor and the citizens; second, a low level of corruption that may be considered negligible by the citizens. Both factors are contingent on local contexts. Thus, the study investigates in clustered local contexts, the impact of variables related to the mayor-citizen (taking account of the duration of the political career, party membership and trasformismo/party-switching) and the level of corruption on mayoral re-election. The results shows that the relationship between the mayor and the citizens is a mitigating factor that works homogeneously across contexts, albeit based on different factors. With regard to low levels of corruption as a mitigating factor, evidence of this is found only in medium and highly developed communities. The theoretical and policy implications are examined.

Purpose: This study investigates the presence of a productivity–quality trade-off in judicial decisions from an organisational standpoint, focusing on the courts as bureaucracies. Applied to the Italian context and focusing on criminal courts, the main question addressed is whether or not increasing productivity diminishes decision quality.Design/methodology/approach: Directional distance function (DDF) models were utilised to assess productivity. Two-sample t-tests are then used to compare the quality of efficient and inefficient units in first instance and appeal, with the aim to determine whether a productivity–quality trade-off exists.Findings: The study’s approach yields results that differ from previous studies. (1) The Italian judicial system is found less efficient. (2) The efficiency of the courts of first instance is relatively uniform. In contrast, there is a difference in efficiency between northern and southern courts of appeal, with northern courts on average being more efficient. (3) The analysis reveals a statistically significant productivity–quality trade-off when the courts of appeal are considered.Research limitations/implications: New evidence of a judicial system is presented, suggesting reforms regarding “reasonable time” as the optimal balance between quality and productivity.Originality/value: The organisational framework leads to evaluating the efficiency of the courts by considering the various types of proceedings based on the gravity/complexity of the cases. In light of the pyramidal structure of the justice system, the quality is then defined in terms of hierarchical control expressed as review rate.