Fang Yu

Dr. Fang Yu


Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

14Years (2013-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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5 September 2013 in Formal Methods in System Design
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Journal Article
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FYFang Yu
Fang Yu
MAMuath Alkhalaf
Muath Alkhalaf
TBTevfik Bultan
Tevfik Bultan
OIOscar H. Ibarra
Oscar H. Ibarra

1 July 2014 in Expert Systems with Applications
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Journal Article
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SHShin-Ying Huang
Shin-Ying Huang
RTRua-Huan Tsaih
Rua-Huan Tsaih
FYFang Yu
Fang Yu

1 May 2013 in IET Control Theory & Applications
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Journal Article
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GLGaiYun Liu
GaiYun Liu
DCDaniel Yuh Chao
Daniel Yuh Chao
FYFang Yu
Fang Yu
Traditional maximally permissive deadlock prevention control for flexible manufacturing systems requires costly reachability analysis. It has been a hot race to synthesise optimal controllers to be maximally permissive with fewest monitors. Previous work shows that among all n ‐dependent siphons, only one siphon (whose unmarked state follows some token distribution) needs to be controlled. This greatly simplifies the supervisor synthesis as well as minimises the number of monitors required while making the controlled net maximally permissive (i.e. all live states can be reached.). This study further proposes a maximally permissive control policy for a subclass of systems of simple sequential processes with resources (S 3 PR) based on the above theory of token distribution pattern of unmarked siphons.

1 July 2018 in Computer Communications
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Journal Article
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FYFang Yu
Fang Yu
YWYat-Wah Wan
Yat-Wah Wan
RTRua-Huan Tsaih
Rua-Huan Tsaih

15 April 2024
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Conference Paper
Open access
CGCheng-Yao Guo
Cheng-Yao Guo
FYFang Yu
Fang Yu
The deployment of deepfake face-swapping technology has matured, becoming widespread on the Internet. The misuse of this technology raises significant concerns for application security and privacy. To counter deepfake threats, we propose a sugar-coated poison defense targeting the latent vectors of generative models. This strategy aims to impact visual effects without substantially increasing reconstruction loss. We establish metrics for visual effects and reconstruction loss to assess perturbation effects on latent vectors, emphasizing those with the most significant impact on visual effects while minimizing reconstruction loss. Our approach begins by utilizing a facial feature extraction model to convert faces into latent representations. We then introduce two latent selection methods: 1) shap-based latent selection using a linear regression model for approximation, and 2) grid search latent selection employing heuristics of adversarial attacks. These methods pinpoint vectors that, when perturbed, can increase face landmark distances while maintaining low mean square errors, commonly used as the optimization metric in deepfake reconstruction models. We apply inconsistent perturbations to selected latent vectors in video frames, acting as sugar-coated poison for deepfake face-swapping applications. Preliminary results demonstrate that these perturbations can be applied to individual videos, resulting in low reconstruction loss. Importantly, they induce measurable consistency reduction in deepfake videos, making them more discernible and accessible to identify.

10 July 2023
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
CGCheng-Yao Guo
Cheng-Yao Guo
FYFang Yu
Fang Yu
The predictive capabilities of machine learning models have improved significantly in recent years, leading to their widespread use in various fields. However, these models remain vulnerable to adversarial attacks, where carefully crafted inputs can mislead predictions and compromise the security of critical systems. Therefore, it is crucial to develop effective methods for detecting and preventing such attacks. Given that many neural network models are implemented using Python, this study addresses the issue of detecting adversarial examples from a new perspective by investigating information leakage in their Python model executions. To realize this objective, we propose a novel Python interpreter that utilizes Python bytecode instrumentation to profile layer-wise instruction-level program executions. We then search for information leakage on both legal and adversarial inputs, identifying their side-channel differences in call executions (i.e., call count, return values, and execution time) and synthesize the detection rule accordingly. Our approach is evaluated against TorchAttacks, AdvDoor, and RNN-Test attacks, targeting various models and applications. Our findings indicate that while there is call-return-value leakage on TorchAttacks images, there is no leakage to detect AdvDoor and RNN-Test attacks based on execution time or return values of string, integer, float, and Boolean type functions.