Patricio Navia

Dr. Patricio Navia

orcid

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

27Years (2000-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

View All Publications
1 April 2000 in Journal of Democracy
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
PDF file
TZThomas D. Zweifel
Thomas D. Zweifel
PNPatricio Navia
Patricio Navia
<!--#include virtual="/journals/includes/copyright/jod2000_bnr.htinc"--> Journal of Democracy 11.2 (2000) 99-114 The effect of economic development in reducing hunger is widely known, but what is the effect of a country's political regime on the basic welfare of its inhabitants? Does it matter whether that country has an authoritarian or a democratic regime? The answer is yes. Any randomly selected country's regime, regardless of its level of development, matters for its social performance. Fewer children die in democracies than in dictatorships. The infant mortality rate is the indicator of chronic hunger most commonly used by policy makers and international organizations. In 138 countries observed annually over the period 1950-90, democracies showed markedly lower infant mortality rates than dictatorships. More importantly, at the same levels of development, and everything else being equal, a country's political regime had an independent effect on infant mortality. Democracy outperformed dictatorship at every level of per-capita GNP. It is well known that per-capita income is inversely correlated with hunger: the higher a country's per-capita GNP, the lower the number of hungry people in that country. But that is far from the whole story. Average per-capita income, for instance, can mask inequalities between rich and poor. Growth in per-capita income is a necessary but not a sufficient requirement for bringing about an end to chronic hunger. Additional factors are needed; one is a country's political regime. A political regime is the institutional framework in which decisions [End Page 99] are made about the production and allocation of public resources, including the provision of public goods and services. The character of the regime may affect performance directly by fostering an environment of opportunity, or indirectly by influencing what rulers are willing and able to do. Democracy has been defined in many ways. For convenience, we adopt the minimal definition first suggested by Adam Przeworski: "Democracy is a system in which parties lose elections," 1 which he and his collaborators later refined by drawing upon Robert Dahl's concept of "contestation." 2 They argue that alternation in power "constitutes prima facie evidence of contestation," which exists where three key requirements are met: 1) "ex ante uncertainty," meaning that "there is some positive probability that at least one member of the incumbent coalition can lose in a particular round of elections"; 2) "ex post irreversibility," meaning "the assurance that whoever wins elections would be allowed to assume office"; and 3) "repeatability," meaning that "elections must be expected to be repeated. Whoever wins the current round of elections cannot use office to make it impossible for the competing political forces to win next time." 3 The study of political regimes and their performance has seen a renaissance with the third wave of democratization. The relative performance of democracy and dictatorship in enhancing a country's development has been hotly debated for years. Competing models about the social performance of political regimes have presented three broad possibilities: 1) that democracy facilitates economic and social development; 2) that democracy hinders development; and 3) that democracy bears no independent relationship to development. 4 The first school of thought argues that democratic government, with its emphasis on civil liberties and political rights, is far better suited than dictatorship to foster the economic pluralism required for sustained, balanced, and equitable economic development. According to this view, democracies address the needs of their populations better because they are more accountable to citizens than are dictatorships. In a democracy, citizens decide through a voting mechanism among policy mixes proposed by candidates competing for office. Since under democracy public decisions must take into account the preferences of the majority, policies are more likely to represent the needs of that majority than they would under dictatorship. According to this school of thought, democracies provide superior welfare for two reasons. First, they perform better because of what they do directly. Democracies bring to power leaders who voice the concerns of the people, and their political institutions...

1 March 2005 in Comparative Political Studies
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
PNPatricio Navia
Patricio Navia
JRJulio Ríos-Figueroa
Julio Ríos-Figueroa
This article maps current constitutional adjudication systems in 17 Latin American democracies. Using recent theoretical literature, the authors classify systems by type (concrete or abstract), timing (a priori or a posteriori), and jurisdiction (centralized or decentralized). This approach captures the richness and diversity of constitutional adjudication in Latin America, where most countries concurrently have two or more mechanisms. Four models of constitutional adjudication are currently in use. In the past, weak democratic institutions and the prevalence of inter partes, as opposed to erga omnes, effects of judicial decisions, prevented the development of constitutional adjudication. Today, democratic consolidation has strengthened the judiciary and fostered constitutional adjudication. After discussing the models, the authors highlight the role of the judiciary in the constitutional adjudication bodies, the broad range of options existing to initiate this adjudication process, and the prevalence of amparo (habeas corpus) provisions.

6 November 2009 in The Journal of Legislative Studies
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
EAEduardo Alemán
Eduardo Alemán
PNPatricio Navia
Patricio Navia
This paper examines the approval of government bills in Chile, evaluating the effect of presidential prerogatives and policy substance, and considering both bill-specific and contextual effects. The results show that presidential prerogatives over financial policy, as well as the ability to affect the congressional agenda through urgent bill scheduling, significantly influence government bill approval. As expected, government success is enhanced during the honeymoon period. However, changes in public approval of the president do not appear to exert a significant effect on the passage of presidential bills.

1 July 2003 in Journal of Democracy
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
PDF file
PNPatricio Navia
Patricio Navia
TZThomas D. Zweifel
Thomas D. Zweifel
This article updates our earlier finding that democracies outperformed dictatorships in 1950-90 by achieving lower infant mortality rates at every level of development. Now we show that this holds even post-Cold War and after the latest wave of democratization. Using 1990-97 data, we again find that democracies outdo dictatorships, though the difference is somewhat smaller now. One key finding is relevant to policymakers: foreign direct investment and aid both significantly reduce IMRs in democracies, but not in dictatorships. Giving money to dictatorships, whether in the form of aid or investment, makes either no difference or even hurts children born there.

1 January 2010 in Latin American Research Review
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
PDF file
PNPatricio Navia
Patricio Navia
Chilean democracy is today more consolidated and inclusive than before the military dictatorship or at any point since the center-left Concertación government came to power. Yet the 1973 coup and Augusto Pinochet's dictatorship remain a defining moment in Chilean history. After all, democracy has been built on the foundations set in place by the country's 1980 Constitution. Although the Constitution has been amended several times, it is a reminder that Pinochet is the father of today's Chile, and the Concertación coalition a deserving stepfather. Four consecutive Concertación governments have helped heal deep social and political wounds and have presided over the most successful period of growth and progress in the nation's history. I discuss the shortcomings of Chilean democracy before 1973 and the status quo of democracy. Although I acknowledge the threat these might pose to further democratic consolidation, they are evidence of a healthy and working democracy. La democracia chilena está hoy más consolidada y es más incluyente que nunca antes, incluyendo el periodo previo al golpe militar de 1973. Pero el golpe y la dictadura de Augusto Pinochet continúan siendo momentos definitorios de la historia nacional. Después de todo, la democracia actual se ha construido sobre los cimientos de la Constitución de Pinochet de 1980. Aunque ha sido enmendada en múltiples ocasiones—y casi todos los enclaves autoritarios han sido eliminados—la constitución nos recuerda que Pinochet es el padre del Chile actual. Pero la gobernante centro-izquierdista Concertación ha sido un meritorio padrastro. Cuatro gobiernos concertacionistas consecutivos han ayudado a sanar profundas heridas sociales y políticas y han liderado al país en su periodo más exitoso de crecimiento económico, inclusión social y progreso democrático en su historia. Aquí discuto las insuficiencias de la democracia chilena antes de 1973. Resumo el contexto en el que emergió la democracia a la sombra del dictador en los años 90. Después de analizar como el diseño institucional de la Constitución de 1980 obstruyó la consolidación democrática, muestro como la democracia se ha consolidado. Discuto el status quo de la democracia, con las tensiones entre una élite satisfecha con democracia desde arriba hacia abajo y crecientes demandas por más participación y más mecanismos de democracia desde abajo hacia arriba. Si bien reconozco que esas demandas pueden constituir una amenaza para la futura consolidación democrática, también subrayo que son simultáneamente evidencia de una democracia más saludable y que funciona mejor.

1 January 2007 in Latin American Politics and Society
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
PDF file
CHClaudia Heiss
Claudia Heiss
PNPatricio Navia
Patricio Navia