Zhao Fangfang

Dr. Zhao Fangfang

orcid

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

2Years (2025-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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YRYingxue Ren
Yingxue Ren
YQYitong Qu
Yitong Qu
JLJunbin Liang
Junbin Liang
ZFZhao Fangfang
Zhao Fangfang
Consumer satisfaction critically determines the operational sustainability of fresh food e-commerce platforms, yet integrated investigations combining multi-source data remain scarce. This study develops a theory–data fusion framework to identify key satisfaction drivers in China’s fresh e-commerce sector. Utilizing Python-based crawlers, we extracted 1252 online reviews of Aksu apples from a certain fresh produce e-commerce platform alongside 509 validated questionnaires. Through systematic literature synthesis, three core dimensions—perceived value (price–performance balance), platform experience (interface usability), and perceived quality (freshness assurance)—were operationalized into measurable indicators. The final structural equation model reveals that perceived value, platform experience, and perceived quality all have significant positive impacts on consumer satisfaction. This study pioneers a methodological paradigm integrating computational text mining (Octopus Collector + SPSS Pro) with traditional psychometric scales, achieving superior model fit (RMSEA = 0.023, CFI = 0.981). These findings empower platforms to implement a precision strategy. The validated framework provides a theoretical basis for omnichannel consumer research while addressing the data-source bias prevalent in prior studies.

17 November 2025 in World Electric Vehicle Journal
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Journal Article
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ZFZhao Fangfang
Zhao Fangfang
YGYiqi Geng
Yiqi Geng
WSWenhui Shi
Wenhui Shi
YRYingxue Ren
Yingxue Ren
The rapid growth of China’s electric vehicle (EV) market has led to a peak in end-of-life (EOL) power batteries, yet the recycling sector remains dominated by informal operations. This paper incorporates the formal and informal recycling participation behaviours of EV owners into the framework of evolutionary games, systematically examines the mechanism by which governmental incentive and disincentive mechanisms influence the evolutionary stability of each party, and constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model involving the government, recycling enterprises, and EV owners. Numerical simulation experiments conducted using PyCharm 2.3 provide an in-depth exploration of the strategic evolutionary trajectories of each participating agent. The findings indicate that (1) the stable strategy for the game-theoretic system of EOL power battery recycling is government non-regulation, recycling enterprises adopting formal recycling practices, and EV owners participating in formal recycling; (2) strengthening penalties against recycling enterprises will accelerate their transition towards formal recycling strategies, while increasing incentive levels can significantly enhance the steady-state probability of firms opting for formal recycling; (3) government subsidies for EV owners encourage both EV owners and recycling enterprises to adopt formal recycling, with recycling enterprises shifting first. This study enriches the application of evolutionary game theory in the field of EOL power battery recycling and further provides guidance for the healthy development of the recycling industry.