The scientific reform movement has proposed openness as a potential remedy to the putative reproducibility or replication crisis. However, the conceptual relationship among openness, replication experiments and results reproducibility has been obscure. We analyse the logical structure of experiments, define the mathematical notion of idealized experiment and use this notion to advance a theory of reproducibility. Idealized experiments clearly delineate the concepts of replication and results reproducibility, and capture key differences with precision, allowing us to study the relationship among them. We show how results reproducibility varies as a function of the elements of an idealized experiment, the true data-generating mechanism, and the closeness of the replication experiment to an original experiment. We clarify how openness of experiments is related to designing informative replication experiments and to obtaining reproducible results. With formal backing and evidence, we argue that the current ‘crisis’ reflects inadequate attention to a theoretical understanding of results reproducibility.
Current attempts at methodological reform in sciences come in response to an overall lack of rigor in methodological and scientific practices in experimental sciences. However, most methodological reform attempts suffer from similar mistakes and over-generalizations to the ones they aim to address. We argue that this can be attributed in part to lack of formalism and first principles. Considering the costs of allowing false claims to become canonized, we argue for formal statistical rigor and scientific nuance in methodological reform. To attain this rigor and nuance, we propose a five-step formal approach for solving methodological problems. To illustrate the use and benefits of such formalism, we present a formal statistical analysis of three popular claims in the metascientific literature: (a) that reproducibility is the cornerstone of science; (b) that data must not be used twice in any analysis; and (c) that exploratory projects imply poor statistical practice. We show how our formal approach can inform and shape debates about such methodological claims.