Psilocybin has shown promise as a novel pharmacological intervention for treatment of depression, where post-acute effects of psilocybin treatment have been associated with increased positive mood and decreased pessimism. Although psilocybin is proving to be effective in clinical trials for treatment of psychiatric disorders, the information processing mechanisms affected by psilocybin are not well understood. Here, we fit active inference and reinforcement learning computational models to a novel two-armed bandit reversal learning task capable of capturing engagement behaviour in rats. The model revealed that after receiving psilocybin, rats achieve more rewards through increased task engagement, mediated by modification of forgetting rates and reduced loss aversion. These findings suggest that psilocybin may afford an optimism bias that arises through altered belief updating, with translational potential for clinical populations characterised by lack of optimism.
Computational Psychiatry publishes original research articles and reviews that involve the application, analysis, or invention of theoretical, computational and statistical approaches to mental function and dysfunction. Topics include brain and behavioral modeling over multiple scales and levels of analysis, and the use of these models to understand psychiatric dysfunction, its remediation, its relation to social or biological factors, and the development and sustenance of healthy cognition throughout the lifespan.
Karl Friston’s free-energy principle casts agents as self-evidencing through active inference. This implies that decision-making, planning and information-seeking are, in a generic sense, ‘wishful’. We take an interdisciplinary perspective on this perplexing aspect of the free-energy principle and unpack the epistemological implications of wishful thinking under the free-energy principle. We use this epistemic framing to discuss the emergence of biases for self-evidencing agents. In particular, we argue that this elucidates an optimism bias as a foundational tenet of self-evidencing. We allude to a historical precursor to some of these themes, interestingly found in Machiavelli’s oeuvre, to contextualise the universal optimism of the free-energy principle.
While causal reasoning is a core facet of our cognitive abilities, its time-course has not received proper attention. As the duration of reasoning might prove crucial in understanding the underlying cognitive processes, we asked participants in two experiments to make probabilistic causal inferences while manipulating time pressure. We found that participants are less accurate under time pressure, a speed-accuracy-tradeoff, and that they respond more conservatively. Surprisingly, two other persistent reasoning errors—Markov violations and failures to explain away—appeared insensitive to time pressure. These observations seem related to confidence: Conservative inferences were associated with low confidence, whereas Markov violations and failures to explain were not. These findings challenge existing theories that predict an association between time pressure and all causal reasoning errors including conservatism. Our findings suggest that these errors should not be attributed to a single cognitive mechanism and emphasize that causal judgements are the result of multiple processes.
Since Tversky (1977) argued that similarity judgments violate the three metric axioms, asymmetrical similarity judgments have been offered as particularly difficult challenges for standard, geometric models of similarity, such as multidimensional scaling. According to Tversky (1977), asymmetrical similarity judgments are driven by differences in salience or extent of knowledge. However, the notion of salience has been difficult to operationalize to different kinds of stimuli, especially perceptual stimuli for which there are no apparent differences in extent of knowledge. To investigate similarity judgments between perceptual stimuli, across three experiments we collected data where individuals would rate the similarity of a pair of temporally separated color patches. We identified several violations of symmetry in the empirical results, which the conventional multidimensional scaling model cannot readily capture. Pothos et al. (2013) proposed a quantum geometric model of similarity to account for Tversky’s (1977) findings. In the present work, we extended this model to a more general framework that can be fit to similarity judgments. We fit several variants of quantum and multidimensional scaling models to the behavioral data and concluded in favor of the quantum approach. Without further modifications of the model, the best-fit quantum model additionally predicted violations of the triangle inequality that we observed in the same data. Overall, by offering a different form of geometric representation, the quantum geometric framework of similarity provides a viable alternative to multidimensional scaling for modeling similarity judgments, while still allowing a convenient, spatial illustration of similarity.
Causal reasoning is a core facet of our cognitive abilities. However, the time-course of causal reasoning is not studied to its fullest. The duration of reasoning, including those that yield a reasoning error, might prove crucial in understanding the cognitive processes underlying causal reasoning. In two experiments we asked participants to make probabilistic causal inferences while manipulating external time pressure and measuring response times. We found that participants are less accurate under time pressure, which can be interpreted as a speed-accuracy-tradeoff. In addition, we found that conservative responding increased under time pressure. Surprisingly, we found that two other persistent reasoning errors - Markov violations and failures to explain away - appear insensitive to the time pressure we employed. These observations seemed related to the confidence that participants expressed in their causal judgment: Conservatism was associated with low confidence, whereas Markov violations and failures to explain were not. These findings shed doubt on existing explanations of causal reasoning that predict an association between time pressure and all reasoning errors. Our findings suggest that these errors should not be attributed to a single cognitive mechanism and emphasize the need for an understanding of causal judgements as the result of multiple processes.