This article presents highly optimized implementations of the Ed25519 digital signature algorithm [Edwards curve digital signature algorithm (EdDSA)]. This algorithm significantly improves the execution time without sacrificing security, compared to exiting digital signature algorithms. Although EdDSA is employed in many widely used protocols, such as TLS and SSH, there appear to be extremely few hardware implementations that focus only on EdDSA. Hence, we propose two different field-programmable gate array (FPGA)-based EdDSA implementations, i.e., efficient and high-performance Ed25519 architectures applicable for a security level comparable to AES-128. Our proposed efficient Ed25519 scheme achieves an improvement of more than 84% compared to the best previous work by reducing the required area. It also incorporates more than 8× speedup. Furthermore, our proposed high-performance architecture shows a 21× speedup with more than 6200 digital signature algorithms per second, showing a significant improvement in terms of utilized area × time on a Xilinx Zynq-7020 FPGA. Finally, the effective side-channel countermeasures are embedded in our proposed designs, which also outperform the previous works.
30 August 2021 in IEEE Transactions on Circuits and Systems I: Regular Papers
Large scale quantum computers will break classical public-key cryptography protocols by quantum algorithms such as Shor’s algorithm. Hence, designing quantum-safe cryptosystems to replace current classical algorithms is crucial. Luckily there are some post-quantum candidates that are assumed to be resistant against future attacks from quantum computers, and NIST is considering standardizing them. Among these candidates, lattice-based cryptography sounds more interesting than others due to the performance results as well as confidence in the security. There are few works in the literature evaluating the performance of lattice-based cryptography in hardware. In this paper, we focus on Cryptographic Suite for Algebraic Lattices (CRYSTALS) key exchange mechanisms known as Kyber and provide an instruction-set hardware architecture and implement on Xilinx Artix-7 FPGA for performance evaluation and testing. Our proposed architecture provides an efficient and high-performance set of components to perform polynomial sampling, number-theoretic transform (NTT), and point-wise multiplication to speed up lattice-based post-quantum cryptography (PQC). This architecture implemented on ASIC outperforms state-of-the-art implementations.
27 July 2021 in IEEE Transactions on Circuits and Systems I: Regular Papers
The Supersingular Isogeny Key Encapsulation mechanism (SIKE) is the only post-quantum key encapsulation protocol based on elliptic curves and isogeny maps between them. Despite the quantum security of the protocol, SIKE requires a greater number of clock cycles and hence does not provide competitive timing and energy consumption results. However, it is more attractive offering the smallest public key as well as ciphertext sizes, which considering the impact of the communication costs and storage of the keys could become a good fit for resource-constrained devices. In this work, we present the fastest practical implementation of SIKE, targeting the platform Cortex-M4 based on the ARMv7-M architecture. We performed our measurements on the STM32F407VG microcontroller for benchmarking the clock cycles and on Nucleo-F411RE attached to X-NUCLEO-LPM01A (Power Shield) for measuring the energy consumption of the protocol. The low-level finite field arithmetic operations play main role in determining the efficiency of SIKE. Therefore, we mainly focus on their optimization and apply them to all NIST-required security levels. Our SIKEp434 implementation for NIST security level 1 is about 22.97% faster than the counterparts appeared in Seo et al. (2020), where for the SIKEp503, SIKEp610 and SIKEp751 the speedup reaches 21.10%, 19.21% and 19.08%. Finally, we benchmark energy consumption and report optimization of up to 11.9% depending on the NIST security level implementation.
6 July 2017 in IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing
We present an efficient implementation of the supersingular isogeny Diffie-Hellman (SIDH) key exchange protocol on 64-bit ARMv8 processors for 125and 160-bit post-quantum security levels. We analyze the use of both affine and projective SIDH formulas and provide a comprehensive analysis of both approaches based on the inversion-to-multiplication ratio. Implementation results show that regardless of security concerns, affine SIDH is competitive with the projective coordinates implementation, and even outperforms projective implementation in the final round of SIDH; however, projective SIDH shows better overall performance for the whole key exchange protocol. Notably, over larger finite fields, using optimized field multiplication leads to the much better performance of projective compared to affine formulas. We integrate our optimized software into the open quantum-safe OpenSSL library and compare our software with other available post-quantum primitives. The benchmark results on ARMv8 demonstrate speedup of up to 5X over the generic version of SIDH implementation which is available inside the OQS library for the same quantum security level. We observe that our highly-optimized implementation still suffers from a large number of operations for computing isogenies of elliptic curves. However, in terms of communication overhead, supersingular isogeny-based cryptosystem provides significantly smaller key size compared to its counterparts.
In this work, we present a high-performance and scalable architecture for isogeny-based cryptosystems. In particular, we use the architecture in a fast, constant-time FPGA implementation of the quantum-resistant supersingular isogeny Diffie-Hellman (SIDH) key exchange protocol. On a Virtex-7 FPGA, we show that our architecture is scalable by implementing at 83, 124, 168, and 252-bit quantum security levels. This is the first SIDH implementation at close to the 256-bit quantum security level to appear in literature. Further, our implementation completes the SIDH protocol 2 times faster than performance-optimized software implementations and 1.34 times faster than the previous best FPGA implementation, both running a similar set of formulas. Our implementation employs inversion-free projective isogeny formulas. By replicating multipliers and utilizing an efficient scheduling methodology, we can heavily parallelize quadratic extension field arithmetic and the isogeny evaluation stage of the large-degree isogeny computation. For a constant-time implementation of 124-bit quantum security SIDH on a Virtex-7 FPGA, we generate ephemeral public keys in 8.0 and 8.6 ms and generate the shared secret key in 7.1 and 7.9 ms for Alice and Bob, respectively. Finally, we show that this architecture could also be used to efficiently generate undeniable and digital signatures based on supersingular isogenies.