In this paper, we address the problem of constructing a robust stealthy attack that compromises uncertain cyberphysical systems having unstable zeros. We first interpret the (non-robust) conventional zero-dynamics attack based on Byrnes- Isidori normal form, and then present a new robust zero-dynamics attack for uncertain plants. Different from the conventional strategy, our key idea is to isolate the real zero-dynamics from the plant's input-output relation and to replace it with an auxiliary nominal zero-dynamics. As a result, this alternative attack does not require the exact model knowledge anymore. The price to pay for the robustness is to utilize the input and output signals of the system (i.e., disclosure resources). It is shown that a disturbance observer can be employed to realize the new attack philosophy when there is a lack of model knowledge. Simulation results with a hydro-turbine power system are presented to verify the attack performance and robustness.

Virtual coupling, which refers to the operation of railway vehicles that enables the merge and separation of vehicles on the move by controlling the gap between the vehicles without any mechanical coupling, is one of the technologies for increasing the transport capacity and enhancing operational efficiency. This paper proposes a robust gap controller based on sliding mode control with a nonlinear train model with uncertainties. Additionally, a gap reference generation scheme is developed that ensures that the merge and separation of two trains is completed before a given location and respects constraints on acceleration and jerk. The position and velocity measurement errors arising from imperfect knowledge of wheel diameters are also considered, and a new error correction scheme is proposed to reduce the perturbation in the gap control performance. The proposed schemes are validated through simulations.

This paper presents a detection algorithm for sensor attacks and a resilient state estimation scheme for a class of uniformly observable nonlinear systems. An adversary is supposed to corrupt a subset of sensors with the possibly unbounded signals, while the system has sensor redundancy. We design an individual high-gain observer for each measurement output so that only the observable portion of the system state is obtained. Then, a nonlinear error correcting problem is solved by collecting all the information from those partial observers and exploiting redundancy. A computationally efficient, on-line monitoring scheme is presented for attack detection. Based on the attack detection scheme, an algorithm for resilient state estimation is provided. The simulation results demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed algorithm.

Smart production systems (SPS) are manufacturing systems capable of autonomously diagnosing their health and autonomously designing continuous improvement projects, leading to the desired productivity improvement. The main component of SPS, developed in this paper, is the Programmable Manufacturing Advisor (PMA), which evaluates the system's health and calculates optimal steps for continuous improvement. The analytics of PMA are based on the theory of Production Systems Engineering (PSE); the numerics of PMA are based on PSE Toolbox, which implements the PSE methods. In this paper, the PMA-based SPS architecture with manager-in-the-loop is described, theoretical/analytical foundations of PMA are outlined, its software/hardware implementations are commented upon, and demonstrations of PMA-based SPS operation are provided using two production systems: automotive underbody assembly (large volume manufacturing) and hot-dip galvanisation plant (small manufacturing organisation).

The security of control systems under sensor attacks is investigated. Redundant observability is introduced, explaining existing security notions including the security index, attack detectability, and observability under attacks. Equivalent conditions between redundant observability and existing notions are presented. Based on a bank of partial observers utilizing Kalman decomposition and a decoder exploiting redundancy, an estimator design algorithm is proposed enhancing the resilience of control systems. This scheme substantially improves computational efficiency utilizing far less memory.

Cyber-physical attacks exploit intrinsic natures of physical systems and can severely damage cyber-physical systems (CPSs) without being detected by the conventional anomaly detector. In this article, based on software-defined networking, we propose a holistic resilient CPS framework that can detect, isolate, and recover from cyber-physical attacks in real time. To show the effectiveness of the proposed framework, we focus on the pole-dynamics attack (PDA), a newly reported stealthy sensor attack that can make the physical system unstable. We develop an efficient detection algorithm for PDA and embed it into the proposed framework. By implementing a testbed, we validate that the proposed framework guarantees resilience of CPS against the PDA.