Zhuang Wang

Dr. Zhuang Wang


Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

3Years (2024-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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3 August 2024 in Systems
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
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JZJinghua Zhao
Jinghua Zhao
RZRuishu Zhang
Ruishu Zhang
ZWZhuang Wang
Zhuang Wang
CSCUI Shaoyun
CUI Shaoyun
Decision-making regarding the low-carbon supply chain, considering corporate social responsibility (CSR) and the heterogeneous preferences of consumers, has become an urgent topic to be explored. This paper explores the decision-making problem of a low-carbon supply chain considering the heterogeneous preferences of consumers under different CSR situations, analyzes the influence of important parameters on each equilibrium solution, compares the size relationship of each equilibrium solution under different CSR situations, and verifies the conclusions obtained through numerical simulation. Then, based on the obtained equilibrium solution, a CSR evolutionary game model of the low-carbon supply chain is constructed, and the evolutionary stability strategies of the two sides on the CSR game are solved. Finally, the evolutionary trajectory of the game system is intuitively presented using a simulation method, and the influence of the main parameters on the evolutionary trends of the two sides is analyzed. The findings are as follows: (1) When both manufacturers and retailers undertake CSR, the retail price and wholesale price are their lowest, while carbon emission reduction, total market demand, manufacturer utility, retailer utility, and supply chain total utility are the highest. (2) When a company undertakes CSR, carbon emission reduction, total market demand, manufacturer utility, retailer utility, and supply chain total utility all increase with the increase in the CSR degree of the company and the ratio of the potential scale of low-carbon consumers to the potential scale of ordinary consumers. (3) The evolutionary stability strategy for both manufacturers and retailers is to undertake CSR. In addition, the initial proportion of manufacturers and retailers that undertake CSR, the low-carbon preference of low-carbon consumers, and the increase in the ratio of the potential scale of low-carbon consumers to the potential scale of ordinary consumers can encourage both members of the supply chain to undertake CSR.

9 March 2025 in SLAS Technology
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
JZJinghua Zhao
Jinghua Zhao
SCShaoyun Cui
Shaoyun Cui
ZWZhuang Wang
Zhuang Wang
In the face of a sudden major epidemic, people's panic may likely lead to the disruption of the public opinion ecosystem and the disorder of public opinion order. Therefore, clarifying the key main bodies and mechanisms in governing online public opinion is of crucial significance for effectively managing and guiding it. Firstly, based on the sentiment analysis of opinion leaders, an evolutionary game model involving the government, netizens, and opinion leaders was constructed. It analyzed the gaming relationships among relevant stakeholders in the process of online opinion dissemination. Then, a simulation experiment is carried out to analyze the evolution of each stakeholder's strategy choice, and the effectiveness of the simulation scenario is verified by NLP technology. The research results show that when dealing with online public opinion during a major epidemic, the government should choose an appropriate time to intervene and reduce the cost of interfering with public opinion. The change in punishment intensity by the government has a greater impact on opinion leaders than on netizens. Additionally, when the government guides opinion leaders, increasing the degree of reward for opinion leaders is more effective than increasing the intensity of punishment.