Grassroots community governance has gained increasing attention for its vital role in resource integration and multi-actor collaboration. As an innovative governance model, the “Five-Sector Linkage” (FSL) mechanism enhances service efficiency by aligning the efforts of communities, social organizations, social workers, volunteers, and philanthropic actors. However, quantitative research on interaction dynamics within such mechanisms remains insufficient, particularly regarding the optimization of collaborative networks for improved governance outcomes. This study applies Social Network Analysis (SNA) to the “After-School Program” project in Community B, Chengdu, to examine the structural features and interrelations of multi-actor cooperation under the FSL framework. The collaboration network consists of 39 nodes and 1482 links, with a density of 0.370 and an average path length of 1.632, indicating efficient communication and moderate cohesion. Degree and betweenness centrality analyses identify social workers (C1–C3) as key hubs, with C2 holding the highest bridging role (B_C = 81.401). The overall network shows low centralization (4.19%) and limited heterogeneity (2.74%), reflecting a polycentric and resilient structure. Inter-sectoral analysis showed that all nodes interacted with at least one social worker, while community actors (A1, A2) engaged broadly across 18 nodes. Volunteers maintained extensive grassroots connections, while philanthropic resources formed selective but strategic links with 13 nodes. These findings provide empirical insights into the coordination logic of the FSL mechanism and offer guidance for building adaptive, decentralized community governance networks. Future research should explore longitudinal dynamics and cross-community comparisons to further enhance the applicability of the model.

Introduction: Under the dual pressures of farmland protection and rural transformation, China’s farmland regulation faces two major challenges: conversion to non-agricultural uses and the expansion of non-grain cultivation. The traditional bureaucratic regulatory regime has exhibited structural failure in addressing these issues. Methods: Using County M as a case, this study examines how for-profit organizations optimize the structure and effectiveness of county-level farmland regulatory networks. Social network analysis (SNA) is employed to quantitatively assess changes before and after the introduction of for-profit organizations (designated as S-type nodes). Results: After the introduction of for-profit organizations, administrative centralization decreased from 27.62% to 24.51%, normative heterogeneity increased from 0.24 to 0.37, and network density and compactness rose to 0.5000 and 0.738, respectively. The average path length shortened to 1.573, fragmentation declined to 0.262, and the number of cohesive subgroups grew by 66.7%. Among these actors, S1 emerged as a structural hub embedded across multiple subsystems, enhancing regulatory responsiveness and reducing policy implementation bias. Discussion: This study moves beyond the Western nonprofit-oriented path dependence in collaborative governance research and, within China’s public land ownership context, reveals how for-profit organizations improve governance effectiveness through structural embeddedness. It translates multi-actor coordination into quantifiable network parameters, clarifies the interaction logic between for-profit organizations and bureaucratic institutions, and demonstrates its impact on network performance. The findings provide quantitative evidence and a replicable approach for shifting farmland regulation from institutional restructuring to structural reshaping.

Uniform legal requirements for written farmland-rental contracts do not necessarily produce uniform contracting practices. This study examines how policy-tool design, transaction heterogeneity, and institutional access jointly structure written-contract adoption in rural China. We coded 101 provincial policy documents across 27 provincial-level regions, of which 69 documents contributed to the baseline policy stock as of 31 December 2021, and analyzed 7237 farmland-transfer transactions using fixed-effects models, common-support restrictions, overlap weighting, and entropy balancing. General contract norms were more extensively operationalized than differentiated risk-governance tools (mean scores, 1.673 vs. 1.309), a pattern observed in 19 of 27 regions. Written-contract adoption was higher among professional agricultural operators and in larger transactions, whereas the positive unadjusted difference for non-local operators reversed after covariate adjustment. Transactions reporting a village-level organization or intermediary channel had an adjusted adoption rate 16.05 percentage points higher than other transactions; estimates remained positive under more local fixed effects and weighting, although magnitude and precision varied across channel configurations and target populations. These findings indicate that contractual formalization is associated with both transaction-specific demand for safeguards and practical access to formal institutions. Effective governance should therefore combine accessible general contracting procedures with tiered risk safeguards and organizational services, while avoiding causal claims from the observational estimates.

Introduction: Territorial health equity depends not only on expanding health resources but also on aligning local capacity with territorial planning contexts. We examined whether changes in hospital and health-center bed allocation were associated more strongly with territorial planning context or local fiscal-economic capacity. Methods: We analyzed a 2015-2023 panel of 1,787 geometry-stable non-district counties in China. The analysis combined county and province-by-year fixed effects, long-difference models, block-level Shapley decomposition, high-mismatch-state transitions, spatial diagnostics, discrete-time exit models, and adjacent-county pair comparisons. Results: Median beds per 10,000 registered residents increased from 35.1 in 2015 to 54.0 in 2023, whereas the distribution of relative planning-supply mismatch changed little. Planning-context and capacity blocks explained similarly small shares of annual variation in total beds. For bed density, the larger baseline planning-context share was driven primarily by the negative population coefficient and did not indicate allocation aligned with observed healthcare need. Higher initial capacity was associated with greater cumulative bed-density growth, lower relative mismatch, and a higher probability of exiting the high-mismatch state. Among county-years previously classified as high-mismatch, 84.0% remained in that state in the following year. Relative mismatch remained spatially clustered, but prefecture boundaries did not significantly amplify capacity-related bed-density gaps. Discussion: Aggregate expansion, relative territorial alignment, and recovery from persistent high mismatch represent distinct health-system outcomes. The findings support context-sensitive allocation, capacity-sensitive financing, and duration-sensitive monitoring, while remaining associational rather than causal.