Based on the interactive integration between smart cities and intelligent transportation, this paper discusses how traditional automobile companies achieve intelligent-connected transformation and how to promote the development of intelligent connected vehicles. First, we construct a tripartite evolutionary game model of traditional automobile companies, internet companies, and financial institutions under the dual-credit policy. Second, we define an ideal event and analyze the impacts of cost factors, market factors, and policy factors on system evolution. Finally, funding time delay is combined with the evolutionary game analysis. Results indicate that: (1) Compared with traditional automobile companies and internet companies, financial institutions are more sensitive to the profit-sharing coefficient and cost-sharing coefficient; (2) The probability of an ideal event is more sensitive to credit trading price than new energy vehicle (NEV) credit accounting coefficients and the NEV credit ratio requirement; (3) The government should fully consider the linkage between policy factors and market factors, and it is unreasonable for the government to consider the range of any factor alone; (4) Both the financing amount and regulatory cost have specific threshold ranges within which tripartite collaboration can be facilitated.

With the continuous development of information and communication technology, “software-defined vehicle” has become the trend of the times. The intelligent connected vehicle (ICV) is becoming a new direction for the development of the automotive industry. Nevertheless, the absence of cooperative innovation in the ICV sector, the dispersal of industrial chain resources, and the absence of enduring and consistent cooperation pose significant obstacles to value co-creation. Therefore, this paper constructs a value co-creation evolutionary game model of the innovation ecosystem of the ICV industry with the automotive enterprise, an intelligent automotive solution provider and the government as players, and applies prospect theory to optimize the tripartite evolutionary game. The payment matrix is established, the expected revenue is analyzed for each player’s strategies, and the replication dynamic equation and evolutionary stability strategy are analyzed. Finally, the theoretical research is validated through numerical simulation. The aim is to promote value co-creation by analyzing the co-evolution mechanism of various stakeholder strategies in the ICV innovation ecosystem. The results show the following: (1) The best evolutionary stability strategy is the positive cross-border cooperation between the automotive enterprise and the intelligent automotive solution provider, while the government gradually does not provide subsidies. (2) The government’s subsidy support should be controlled within an appropriate range. If the subsidy is too great, the marginal effect of incentives will gradually weaken. (3) The players’ willingness to integrate across borders can be enhanced by a higher level of trust and resource complementarity between the automotive enterprise and intelligent automotive solution provider. Also, liquidated damages and opportunity loss can effectively prevent the occurrence of negative integration behaviors. (4) The greater the risk attitude coefficient and risk aversion coefficient of the automotive enterprise and intelligent automotive solution provider, the more conducive they are to the occurrence of positive integration behavior.

As electric vehicles scale up, battery recycling has become critical to the circular economy. Yet ESG adoption in battery recycling is not merely an internal managerial choice but is also shaped by green social expectations and social comparison among firms. This study examines how these two forces affect recycling and pricing under non-adoption, partial adoption, and full adoption. We develop a dynamic game model in which green social expectations generate goodwill premiums and losses, while comparison-induced pride and guilt feed back into goodwill accumulation and strategic decisions. We find that green social expectations strengthen recycling incentives and reshape market demand through goodwill effects. Interestingly, guilt exerts a stronger effect than pride in social comparison, encouraging firms to increase recycling effort and accumulate higher goodwill. We also find that full ESG adoption helps firms build stable goodwill advantages, ease price competition, and improve long-term profitability. By contrast, partial adoption may trigger free-riding and strategic divergence. A key theoretical contribution is the joint integration of green social expectations, social comparison, and ESG adoption within a unified dynamic framework, with goodwill linking behavioral responses to firms’ recycling and pricing decisions. Managerially, firms should align ESG practices with continuous recycling effort, while regulators should improve the transparency and comparability of ESG performance to facilitate coordinated adoption.