Dry fogging is a relatively new decontamination technology that uses liquid disinfectant and compressed air as consumables. The ultrafine droplet size of the dry fog prevents it from easily falling onto surfaces, a desirable quality for space/area decontaminations. Liquid peracetic acid (PAA) has been shown to have excellent microbicidal activity; however, it has compatibility issues with a variety of materials. The objectives of this study were to determine the microbicidal activity, compatibility to electronic equipment, decontamination potential for laboratories, and mold remediation potential for a walk-in cooler of the dry fogging system (DFS) using PAA. Stainless steel coupons spiked with a select number of microbial agents (Escherichia coli, Staphylococcus aureus, Bacillus atrophaeus spores, Vesicular stomatitis virus, and Human adenovirus 5) were exposed to the dry fog to determine its microbicidal activity. Decontaminations of a simulated laboratory and high-containment laboratories were validated using commercially available biological indicators placed at several locations within the area. Compatibility to electronic equipment was assessed by repeatedly exposing personal computers to the dry fog over a 6-month period. All test microbial agents were inactivated by the dry fog; laboratory decontamination and mold remediation validations were successful. No functional impairment was detected in the personal computers following six rounds of exposure. Results show that the DFS is an effective decontamination technology for laboratories as an alternative to formaldehyde, vaporous hydrogen peroxide, or gaseous chlorine dioxide (GCD).

High-consequence pathogens such as the Ebola, Marburg, and Lassa viruses are handled in maximum-containment biosafety level 4 (BSL-4) laboratories. Genetic material is often isolated from such viruses and subsequently removed from BSL-4 laboratories for a multitude of downstream analyses using readily accessible technologies and equipment available at lower-biosafety level laboratories. However, it is essential to ensure that these materials are free of viable viruses before removal from BSL-4 laboratories to guarantee sample safety. This study details the in-house procedure used for validating the inactivation of Ebola, Marburg, and Lassa virus cultures after incubation with AVL lysis buffer (Qiagen) and ethanol. This study’s findings show that no viable virus was detectable when high-titer cultures of Ebola, Marburg, and Lassa viruses were incubated with AVL lysis buffer for 10 min, followed by an equal volume of 95% ethanol for 3 min, using a method with a sensitivity of ≤0.8 log₁₀ TCID₅₀ as the limit of detection.

High consequence pathogens such as Ebola, Marburg and Lassa viruses are handled in maximum containment Biosafety Level 4 (BSL-4) laboratories. Genetic material is often isolated from such viruses and subsequently removed from BSL-4 for a multitude of downstream analyses using readily accessible technologies and equipment available at lower biosafety level laboratories. However, it is essential to ensure that these materials are free of viable viruses before removal from BSL-4 to guarantee sample safety. This study details the in-house procedure used for validating the inactivation of Ebola, Marburg and Lassa virus cultures after incubation with AVL lysis buffer (Qiagen) and ethanol. This study’s findings showed no viable virus was detectable when high-titer cultures of Ebola, Marburg, and Lassa viruses were incubated with AVL lysis buffer for 10 minutes, followed by an equal volume of 95% ethanol for 3 minutes, using a method with a sensitivity of ≤0.8 log10 TCID50 as the limit of detection.