The energy sector’s long-term sustainability increasingly relies on widespread renewable energy generation. Shared energy storage embodies sharing economy principles within the storage industry. This approach allows storage facilities to monetize unused capacity by offering it to users, generating additional revenue for providers, and supporting renewable energy prosumers’ growth. However, high investment costs and long payback periods often hinder the development of battery storage. To address this challenge, we propose a shared storage investment framework. In this framework, a storage investor virtualizes physical storage equipment, enabling prosumers to access storage services as though they owned the batteries themselves. We adopt a cooperative game approach to incorporate storage sharing into the design phase of energy systems. To ensure a fair distribution of cooperative benefits, we introduce a benefit allocation mechanism based on contributions to energy storage sharing. Utilizing realistic data from three buildings, our simulations demonstrate that the shared storage mechanism creates a win–win situation for all participants. It also enhances the self-sufficiency and self-consumption of renewable energy. This paper provides valuable insights for shared storage investors regarding optimal design and benefit allocation among multiple stakeholders.
Given the spatial heterogeneity of the social-economic situations across different regions in China, the decomposition of emission reduction targets should be designed according to the actual characteristics of the industrial economy. There is concern about the loss of industrial competitiveness and leakage of CO2 emissions if just seven pilot carbon markets operate independently, so the national carbon market of the power sector was established in 2021. In this study, a China two-region CGE model including Guangdong (GD) and the rest of China (ROC) is built on an analysis of the long-term effects of CO2 prices in industrial sectors at the target 2030 peak. Based on this model, we constructed one business-as-usual scenario and six comparison carbon tax scenarios to quantify the CO2 cost impact for a wide range of manufacturing sectors and identify specific economic activities that face relatively high CO2 costs between the two regions. Based on the China two-region CGE model, the risks of leakage and competitiveness distortions in these potentially exposed sectors are qualitatively assessed. The results show that chemical, nonferrous metal, and machinery are GD’s competitive sectors, and agriculture, food, textile, paper, cement, construction, and service belong to ROC’s competitive industry. Both GD and ROC need to further unify carbon pricing policies at the same time to effectively coordinate the carbon intensity reduction target and industrial development, which is 2.6% and 3.2% of the severe GDP loss compared with BaU when implementing carbon tax policy. The results can support the setting of the carbon tax and industrial competitiveness promotion policy and with a strong reference to support the provincial emission reduction path.