The rapid expansion of Internet-of-Things (IoT) applications necessitates a thorough understanding of network configurations to address unique challenges across various use cases. This paper presents an in-depth analysis of three IoT network topologies: linear chain, structured tree, and dynamic transition networks, each designed to meet the specific requirements of industrial automation, home automation, and environmental monitoring. Key performance metrics, including round-trip time (RTT), server processing time (SPT), and power consumption, are evaluated through both simulation and hardware experiments. Additionally, this study introduces an enhanced UDP protocol featuring an acknowledgment mechanism and a power consumption evaluation, aiming to improve data transmission reliability over the standard UDP protocol. Packet loss is specifically measured in hardware experiments to compare the performance of standard and enhanced UDP protocols. The findings show that the enhanced UDP significantly reduces packet loss compared to the standard UDP, enhancing data delivery reliability across dynamic and structured networks, though it comes at the cost of slightly higher power consumption due to additional processing. For network topology performance, the linear chain topology provides stable processing but higher RTT, making it suitable for applications such as tunnel monitoring; the structured tree topology offers low energy consumption and fast communication, ideal for home automation; and the dynamic transition network, suited for industrial Automated Guided Vehicles (AGVs), encounters challenges with adaptive routing. These insights guide the optimization of communication protocols and network configurations for more efficient and reliable IoT deployments.
This study introduces a sensor-centric cybersecurity framework for railway infrastructure that extends Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) from traditional reliability evaluation into the domain of cyber-induced failures affecting data integrity, availability and authenticity. The contribution lies in bridging regulatory obligations of the NIS2 Directive with field-layer monitoring by enabling risk indicators to evolve dynamically rather than remain static documentation artefacts. The approach is demonstrated using a scenario-based dataset collected from approximately 250 trackside, rolling-stock, environmental and power-monitoring sensors deployed over a 25 km operational segment, with representative anomalies generated through controlled spoofing, replay and injection conditions. Risk was evaluated using RPN scores derived from Severity–Occurrence–Detectability scales, while anomaly-detection performance was observed through detection-latency variation, changes in RPN distribution, and qualitative responsiveness of timestamp-based alerts. Instead of presenting a fixed benchmark, the results show how evidence from real sensor streams can recalibrate O and D factors in near-real-time and reduce undetected exposure windows, enabling measurable compliance documentation aligned with NIS2 Article 21. The findings confirm that coupling FMEA with streaming telemetry creates a verifiable risk-evaluation loop and supports a transition toward continuous, evidence-driven cybersecurity governance in railway systems.