Wei Yan

Dr. Wei Yan


Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

10Years (2017-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

View All Publications
1 March 2018 in European Journal of Operational Research
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
WYWei Yan
Wei Yan
YXYu Xiong
Yu Xiong
JCJunhong Chu
Junhong Chu
GLGendao Li
Gendao Li
ZXZhongkai Xiong
Zhongkai Xiong

4 August 2020 in International Journal of Production Research
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
FZFeng Zhang
Feng Zhang
HCHong Chen
Hong Chen
YXYu Xiong
Yu Xiong
WYWei Yan
Wei Yan
MLMeilian Liu
Meilian Liu
Cannibalisation is still a concern for original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) when they outsource remanufacturing operations to the authorised remanufacturers (ARs). In dealing with the cannibalisation in remanufacturing outsourcing, many OEMs (such as Sun, Apple, Hewlett Packard, Bosch Tools, and Gateway) use core collecting or remanufactured product remarketing. Motivated by examples from industry, we develop two models in which an OEM produces new products but outsources remanufacturing operations to a AR. The two potential strategies for dealing with the cannibalisation from remanufacturing outsourcing are: (1) collecting used cores from consumers, or (2) remarketing all remanufactured products to consumers. Among other results, we find that minimising cannibalisation problems does not equate with maximising profits. In particular, if the collection cost coefficient is not pronounced, the aggressive response by the OEM can effectively minimise the cannibalisation problems, but will reduce the profitability for the OEM on the other hand. Further, as the collection cost coefficient is moderate, remarketing remanufactured products can secure Pareto improvements. As such, we suggest that, practising managers should combine the cannibalisation problems of remanufacturing with the costs of collecting used cores.

9 January 2018 in Sustainability
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
WYWei Yan
Wei Yan
HLHengyu Li
Hengyu Li
JCJunwu Chai
Junwu Chai
ZQZhifeng Qian
Zhifeng Qian
HCHong Chen
Hong Chen
Despite the remanufacturing process having demonstrated economic, social, and environmental benefits, many original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) have not engaged in the remanufacturing process themselves, as they often outsource it to a third party. In practice, such outsourcing usually involves two different options/modes for OEMs with consideration of take-back operations: (1) owning the reverse channel and collecting cores directly (Model D) or (2) outsourcing these operations to a third-party remanufacturer (TPR) and collecting cores indirectly (Model I). However, this raises the important question of whether OEMs should also outsource their reverse channels to third-party remanufacturers when outsourcing remanufacturing. Furthermore, there needs to be an investigation of which method is more beneficial in terms of economic, social, and environmental outcomes. This paper uses modelling to investigate the costs and benefits of these options in terms of sustainability. We found that, compared to Model I, the OEM conducting take-back operations itself can achieve the overall better outcomes for all economic, social, and environmental situations.

6 June 2019 in Journal of the Operational Research Society
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
JCJunwu Chai
Junwu Chai
WYWei Yan
Wei Yan
YLYouwei Li
Youwei Li
MPMark Palmer
Mark Palmer
QHQilin Huang
Qilin Huang
Many manufacturers have adopted differentiated distribution channels to market vertically differentiated products. However, there is scant literature addressing the quality differentiation in the presence of differentiated channel policies. We, therefore, examine whether (how) differentiated channel policies affect manufacturers’ quality differentiation and all parties’ performance. Specifically, we consider a manufacturer who produces high- and low products together, but with two marketing options: (1) distributing both products through one retailer (Model O), or (2) providing high quality products through one channel but low-tier products through another (Model T). Our results show that the manufacturer is more likely to decrease the level of quality differentiation in Model T than in Model O. Moreover, we show that “quality distortion” is not limited to low-tier products but can occur with high-tier products. We also comment on how the additional horizontal consumer heterogeneity affects our results and the implications of the competition at the manufacturer level.

10 April 2018 in Sustainability
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
WYWei Yan
Wei Yan
JCJunwu Chai
Junwu Chai
ZQZhifeng Qian
Zhifeng Qian
Sang-Bing TsaiSang-Bing Tsai
Sang-Bing Tsai
HCHong Chen
Hong Chen
XYXiong Yu
Xiong Yu
Due to increasing consciousness of sustainability and pressure from legislation, numerous studies and managers have sought to integrate traditional operations management with green environment and social responsibility. One such effort is remanufacturing, which has emerged as a growing topic. Although outsourcing remanufacturing operations to third-party remanufacturers (TPRs) has been well studied in the literature, the research has paid little attention to the fact that original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) have the flexibility of outsourcing to other agents but not TPRs. In practice, besides TPRs, many brand-name OEMs have outsourced remanufacturing operations to their suppliers. The question this raises is: TPR vs. supplier, which remanufacturer is better for the economic, environment and social responsibility? To understand this fundamental question, in this paper, we develop two models that allow an OEM to have potential flexibility to (1) outsource remanufacturing operations to a TPR (Model T) or (2) outsource remanufacturing operations to a supplier (Model S). Among other results, we find that, although the Model T creates more potentially sustainable economic, social, and environmental situations, this strategy is not supported by the supplier because it always leaves the supplier worse off. In order to achieve a “win-win-win” outcome that meets economic, social, and environmental requirements for all parties, a revenue-sharing contract is proposed and incorporated into Model T.

2 July 2020 in Journal of the Operational Research Society
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
JCJunwu Chai
Junwu Chai
HLHengyu Li
Hengyu Li
WYWei Yan
Wei Yan
YLYouwei Li
Youwei Li
Due to fierce competition in the product market under conditions of supplier encroachment, many brand name retailers, including Sears, Best Buy, and Circuit City, depend on the extended warranty contracts that they sell along with the products. The distribution of extended warranties through an intermediary can be characterized in terms of two basic forms. A large proportion of retailers sell their own extended warranty, whilst others choose to resell the extended warranty provided by upstream agents. Several questions arise from these conditions. How will optimum decisions vary under different strategic choice? Is it profitable for a retailer to engage in selling extended warranties? And finally, which strategy is more profitable for related players? We answer these questions using a game theoretic model where the retailer has the flexibility to choose between offering its own extended warranties (Model ER) or reselling extended warranties provided by a manufacturer (Model EM). Our analysis reveals that it is indeed a profitable business for both parties when the retailer engages in selling extended warranty, irrespective of whether they are owned by the retailer or by the manufacturer. Surprisingly, we find that, when marketing cost of the extended warranty is high, the retailer benefits more from reselling the extended warranty, a strategy that is always beneficial for the manufacturer. Put differently, when marketing cost of the extended warranty is high, reselling extended warranties from the manufacturer can secure Pareto improvements. However, when marketing cost of the extended warranty is not pronounced, a preference confliction arises between both parties: The retailer prefers to sell its own extended warranty, while the manufacturer would be fond of the other one. Extending both models to the case where the manufacturer encroaches into retail market with selling both products and extended warranty reveals that the preference confliction between both parties is quite robust.