Development introduces structured correlations among traits that may constrain or bias the distribution of phenotypes produced. Moreover, when suitable heritable variation exists, natural selection may alter such constraints and correlations, affecting the phenotypic variation available to subsequent selection. However, exactly how the distribution of phenotypes produced by complex developmental systems can be shaped by past selective environments is poorly understood. Here we investigate the evolution of a network of recurrent nonlinear ontogenetic interactions, such as a gene regulation network, in various selective scenarios. We find that evolved networks of this type can exhibit several phenomena that are familiar in cognitive learning systems. These include formation of a distributed associative memory that can “store” and “recall” multiple phenotypes that have been selected in the past, recreate complete adult phenotypic patterns accurately from partial or corrupted embryonic phenotypes, and “generalize” (by exploiting evolved developmental modules) to produce new combinations of phenotypic features. We show that these surprising behaviors follow from an equivalence between the action of natural selection on phenotypic correlations and associative learning, well‐understood in the context of neural networks. This helps to explain how development facilitates the evolution of high‐fitness phenotypes and how this ability changes over evolutionary time.

The structure and organisation of ecological interactions within an ecosystem is modified by the evolution and coevolution of the individual species it contains. Understanding how historical conditions have shaped this architecture is vital for understanding system responses to change at scales from the microbial upwards. However, in the absence of a group selection process, the collective behaviours and ecosystem functions exhibited by the whole community cannot be organised or adapted in a Darwinian sense. A long-standing open question thus persists: Are there alternative organising principles that enable us to understand and predict how the coevolution of the component species creates and maintains complex collective behaviours exhibited by the ecosystem as a whole? Here we answer this question by incorporating principles from connectionist learning, a previously unrelated discipline already using well-developed theories on how emergent behaviours arise in simple networks. Specifically, we show conditions where natural selection on ecological interactions is functionally equivalent to a simple type of connectionist learning, ‘unsupervised learning’, well-known in neural-network models of cognitive systems to produce many non-trivial collective behaviours. Accordingly, we find that a community can self-organise in a well-defined and non-trivial sense without selection at the community level; its organisation can be conditioned by past experience in the same sense as connectionist learning models habituate to stimuli. This conditioning drives the community to form a distributed ecological memory of multiple past states, causing the community to: a) converge to these states from any random initial composition; b) accurately restore historical compositions from small fragments; c) recover a state composition following disturbance; and d) to correctly classify ambiguous initial compositions according to their similarity to learned compositions. We examine how the formation of alternative stable states alters the community’s response to changing environmental forcing, and we identify conditions under which the ecosystem exhibits hysteresis with potential for catastrophic regime shifts. This work highlights the potential of connectionist theory to expand our understanding of evo-eco dynamics and collective ecological behaviours. Within this framework we find that, despite not being a Darwinian unit, ecological communities can behave like connectionist learning systems, creating internal conditions that habituate to past environmental conditions and actively recalling those conditions. This article was reviewed by Prof. Ricard V Solé, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona and Prof. Rob Knight, University of Colorado, Boulder.

The mechanisms of variation, selection and inheritance, on which evolution by natural selection depends, are not fixed over evolutionary time. Current evolutionary biology is increasingly focussed on understanding how the evolution of developmental organisations modifies the distribution of phenotypic variation, the evolution of ecological relationships modifies the selective environment, and the evolution of reproductive relationships modifies the heritability of the evolutionary unit. The major transitions in evolution, in particular, involve radical changes in developmental, ecological and reproductive organisations that instantiate variation, selection and inheritance at a higher level of biological organisation. However, current evolutionary theory is poorly equipped to describe how these organisations change over evolutionary time and especially how that results in adaptive complexes at successive scales of organisation (the key problem is that evolution is self-referential, i.e. the products of evolution change the parameters of the evolutionary process). Here we first reinterpret the central open questions in these domains from a perspective that emphasises the common underlying themes. We then synthesise the findings from a developing body of work that is building a new theoretical approach to these questions by converting well-understood theory and results from models of cognitive learning. Specifically, connectionist models of memory and learning demonstrate how simple incremental mechanisms, adjusting the relationships between individually-simple components, can produce organisations that exhibit complex system-level behaviours and improve the adaptive capabilities of the system. We use the term “evolutionary connectionism” to recognise that, by functionally equivalent processes, natural selection acting on the relationships within and between evolutionary entities can result in organisations that produce complex system-level behaviours in evolutionary systems and modify the adaptive capabilities of natural selection over time. We review the evidence supporting the functional equivalences between the domains of learning and of evolution, and discuss the potential for this to resolve conceptual problems in our understanding of the evolution of developmental, ecological and reproductive organisations and, in particular, the major evolutionary transitions.

The truly surprising thing about evolution is not how it makes individuals better adapted to their environment, but how it makes individuals. All individuals are made of parts that used to be individuals themselves, e.g., multicellular organisms from unicellular organisms. In such evolutionary transitions in individuality, the organised structure of relationships between component parts causes them to work together, creating a new organismic entity and a new evolutionary unit on which selection can act. However, the principles of these transitions remain poorly understood. In particular, the process of transition must be explained by “bottom-up” selection, i.e., on the existing lower-level evolutionary units, without presupposing the higher-level evolutionary unit we are trying to explain. In this hypothesis and theory manuscript we address the conditions for evolutionary transitions in individuality by exploiting adaptive principles already known in learning systems.Connectionistlearning models, well-studied in neural networks, demonstrate how networks of organised functional relationships between components, sufficient to exhibit information integration and collective action, can be produced via fully-distributed and unsupervised learning principles, i.e., without centralised control or an external teacher. Evolutionary connectionism translates these distributed learning principles into the domain of natural selection, and suggests how relationships among evolutionary units could become adaptively organised by selection from below without presupposing genetic relatedness or selection on collectives. In this manuscript, we address how connectionist models with a particular interaction structure might explain transitions in individuality. We explore the relationship between the interaction structures necessary for (a) evolutionary individuality (where the evolution of the whole is a non-decomposable function of the evolution of the parts), (b) organismic individuality (where the development and behaviour of the whole is a non-decomposable function of the behaviour of component parts) and (c) non-linearly separable functions, familiar in connectionist models (where the output of the network is a non-decomposable function of the inputs). Specifically, we hypothesise that the conditions necessary to evolve a new level of individuality are described by the conditions necessary to learn non-decomposable functions of this type (or deep model induction) familiar in connectionist models of cognition and learning.

Social evolution theory conventionally takes an externalist explanatory stance, treating observed cooperation as explanandum and the positive assortment of cooperative behaviour as explanans. We ask how the circumstances bringing about this positive assortment arose in the first place. Rather than merely push the explanatory problem back a step, we move from an externalist to an interactionist explanatory stance, in the spirit of Lewontin and the Niche Construction theorists. We develop a theory of ‘social niche construction’ in which we consider biological entities to be both the subject and object of their own social evolution. Some important cases of the evolution of cooperation have the side-effect of causing changes in the hierarchical level at which the evolutionary process acts. This is because the traits (e.g. life-history bottlenecks) that act to align the fitness interests of particles (e.g. cells) in a collective can also act to diminish the extent to which those particles are bearers of heritable fitness variance, while augmenting the extent to which collectives of such particles (e.g. multicellular organisms) are bearers of heritable fitness variance. In this way, we can explain upward transitions in the hierarchical level at which the Darwinian machine operates in terms of particle-level selection, even though the outcome of the process is a collective-level selection regime. Our theory avoids the logical and metaphysical paradoxes faced by other attempts to explain evolutionary transitions.