In previous papers, we proposed that the dorsal attention system’s top-down control is regulated by the dorsal division of the limbic system, providing a feedforward or impulsive form of control generating expectancies during active inference. In contrast, we proposed that the ventral attention system is regulated by the ventral limbic division, regulating feedback constraints and error-correction for active inference within the neocortical hierarchy. Here, we propose that these forms of cognitive control reflect vertical integration of subcortical arousal control systems that evolved for specific forms of behavior control. The feedforward impetus to action is regulated by phasic arousal, mediated by lemnothalamic projections from the reticular activating system of the lower brainstem, and then elaborated by the hippocampus and dorsal limbic division. In contrast, feedback constraint—based on environmental requirements—is regulated by the tonic activation furnished by collothalamic projections from the midbrain arousal control centers, and then sustained and elaborated by the amygdala, basal ganglia, and ventral limbic division. In an evolutionary-developmental analysis, understanding these differing forms of active affordance—for arousal and motor control within the subcortical vertebrate neuraxis—may help explain the evolution of active inference regulating the cognition of expectancy and error-correction within the mammalian 6-layered neocortex.
The organization of consciousness is described through increasingly rich theoretical models. We review evidence that working memory capacity—essential to generating consciousness in the cerebral cortex—is supported by dual limbic memory systems. These dorsal (Papez) and ventral (Yakovlev) limbic networks provide the basis for mnemonic processing and prediction in the dorsal and ventral divisions of the human neocortex. Empirical evidence suggests that the dorsal limbic division is (i) regulated preferentially by excitatory feedforward control, (ii) consolidated by REM sleep, and (iii) controlled in waking by phasic arousal through lemnothalamic projections from the pontine brainstem reticular activating system. The ventral limbic division and striatum, (i) organizes the inhibitory neurophysiology of NREM to (ii) consolidate explicit memory in sleep, (iii) operating in waking cognition under the same inhibitory feedback control supported by collothalamic tonic activation from the midbrain. We propose that (i) these dual (excitatory and inhibitory) systems alternate in the stages of sleep, and (ii) in waking they must be balanced—at criticality—to optimize the active inference that generates conscious experiences. Optimal Bayesian belief updating rests on balanced feedforward (excitatory predictive) and feedback (inhibitory corrective) control biases that play the role of prior and likelihood (i.e., sensory) precision. Because the excitatory (E) phasic arousal and inhibitory (I) tonic activation systems that regulate these dual limbic divisions have distinct affective properties, varying levels of elation for phasic arousal (E) and anxiety for tonic activation (I), the dual control systems regulate sleep and consciousness in ways that are adaptively balanced—around the entropic nadir of E–I criticality—for optimal self-regulation of consciousness and psychological health. Because they are emotive as well as motive control systems, these dual systems have unique qualities of feeling that may be registered as subjective experience.
The representation of intelligence is achieved by patterns of connections among neurons in brains and machines. Brains grow continuously, such that their patterns of connections develop through activity-dependent specification, with the continuing ontogenesis of individual experience. The theory of active inference proposes that the developmental organization of sentient systems reflects general processes of informatic self-evidencing, through the minimization of free energy. We interpret this theory to imply that the mind may be described in information terms that are not dependent on a specific physical substrate. At a certain level of complexity, self-evidencing of living (self-organizing) information systems becomes hierarchical and reentrant, such that effective consciousness emerges as the consequence of a good regulator. We propose that these principles imply that an adequate reconstruction of the computational dynamics of an individual human brain/mind is possible with sufficient neuromorphic computational emulation.
The representation of intelligence is achieved by patterns of connections among neurons in brains and machines. Brains grow continuously, such that their patterns of connections develop through activity-dependent specification with the continuing ontogenesis of individual experience. The theory of active inference proposes that the developmental organization of sentient systems reflects general processes of informatic self-evidencing, through the minimization of free energy, that may be described in information terms that are not dependent on a specific physical substrate. At a certain level of complexity, self-evidencing of living (self-organizing) information systems becomes hierarchic and reentrant, such that effective consciousness emerges as the consequence of a good regulator. These principles imply that an adequate reconstruction of the computational dynamics of an individual human brain is possible with a sufficient neuromorphic emulation.