As important methods of ecofriendly transportation, the supply chain coordination of new energy vehicles (NEVs) is an important issue in the field of sustainability. This study constructs a Stackelberg game composed of a power battery supplier and an NEV manufacturer. To better describe the coordination relationship in the NEV supply chain, we introduce the Nash bargaining framework into the fairness concern preference utility function. Through a comprehensive discussion of shareholding ratios and external environment factors, we discover that the traditional shareholding strategy fails to coordinate the NEV supply chain effectively, as enterprises seek to avoid losing management control, which occurs when excessive shares are held by others. In this context, this study proposes a novel industry–university–research (IUR) shareholding strategy, which can more easily achieve supply chain coordination and improve social welfare. In particular, this study reveals the superiority of the novel strategy in eliminating the double-marginal effect caused by high fairness concern preference among NEV enterprises. Based on these facts, we provide enterprises with optimal strategies under different conditions and offer a government-optimal subsidy to maximize the social welfare function.

Purpose: This paper aims to provide product design recommendations for electric vehicle supply chains (EVSCs) to improve market penetration in cold regions amidst growing market competition. Design/methodology/approach: Based on two green product design approaches, we propose two electric vehicle (EV) designs with distinct cost structures: power battery expansion (Scheme N) and cold-resistance R&D (Scheme R). From a product design perspective, we consider the characteristics of the EVSC and use game theory to develop a dual oligopoly supply chain (SC) model under joint competition in price and range. By introducing range as a decision variable, we comprehensively analyze the effects of range anxiety, low temperature coefficients, production and R&D capabilities and competitive intensities on optimal solutions for firms. Findings: The findings of the study are as follows: (1) the applicability and advantages of Scheme R increase as the gap between joint competition intensities narrows. High levels of range competition are consistently detrimental to the EVSC, as they hinder improvements in EV range and may reduce profits when consumer range anxiety is mitigated. (2) R&D capability significantly influences the choice of the optimal scheme. Scheme N should be selected only when R&D capabilities are limited and optimal cold-resistance performance is low. Unexpectedly, in colder temperatures with higher consumer anxiety, consumers tend to prefer purchasing EVs under Scheme N. Originality/value: This study extends the green SC research by incorporating the specific needs of EVSCs and exploring the competitive dynamics of products with different structural approaches within the same market.