Currently, the construction of smart cities (SCs) has been booming all over the world and it also acts as a useful tool for the Chinese government to promote the sustainable development of cities. Identifying the aspects of SCs and systematically evaluating the level of smart city construction are significant for urban management and healthy development. Based on the bibliometrics and Chinese experience with smart city construction, this paper firstly proposes dividing the smart city system into four subsystems, that is, smart infrastructure, smart economy, smart governance and smart participation and to establish their corresponding indicator systems. Information entropy method and grey correlation analysis are then adopted to determine the weight of each indicator and evaluate the city smartness level respectively. After that, 20 major cities in China are taken as cases for evaluation. The evaluation is performed on the grey correlation degree of these cities and their variations between 2012 and 2016. Through the further comparison of regional distribution and clustering analysis of these cities, the paper points out the general characteristics and level differences of smart city construction in China. Finally, some policy implications are proposed to improve the smartness level for Chinese cities.

Rapid urbanization poses great challenges to water-energy-food nexus (WEF-Nexus) system, calling for integrative resources governance to improve the synergies between subsystems that constitute the Nexus. This paper explores the synergies within the WEF-Nexus in Shenzhen city while using the synergetic model. We first identify the order parameters and their causal paths in three subsystems and set several eigenvectors under each parameter. Secondly, a synergetic model is developed to calculate the synergy degree among parameters, and the synergetic networks are then further constructed. Centrality analysis on the synergetic networks reveals that the centralities of food subsystem perform the highest level while the water subsystem at the lowest level. Finally, we put forward some policy implications for cross-sectoral resources governance by embedding the synergy degree into causal paths. The results show that the synergies of the Nexus system in Shenzhen can be maximized by stabilizing water supply, coordinating the energy imports and exports, and reducing the crops sown areas.

Purpose: The purpose of this paper is to study how to effectively allocate water, energy and food (WEF) resources in urban development. Design/methodology/approach: An agent-based model combined with NetLogo simulation model has been used in this paper. Findings: This paper proposes a framework for agent analysis in urban WEF consumption. Research limitations/implications: Further discussions using empirical data are of great importance. Practical implications: Apply to form the development model of the city in the future. Originality/value: A new method of WEF management has been used at the city level.

This study aims to analyze the impact of “overseeing the government” on corporate pollution control and emission reduction behavior and the choice of corporate emission reduction paths. The central government in China persistently reinforces its environmental oversight of local governments. The effectiveness of environmental protection is closely tied to the performance of local officials and the implementation of the “one vote veto” system in the realm of environmental conservation. In this study, we use the evolutionary game model theory and the DID model to test the impact of “overseeing the government” on the environmental behavior of enterprises. Specifically, this study establishes an evolutionary game model between local government and enterprises, exploring how the local government and the enterprise make decisions. The theoretical findings are validated using pollution data from industrial enterprises in China. The study reveals that enterprises are influenced by local governments primarily when the costs of environmental abatement are relatively low, and the costs of noncompliance are high. Strengthening government oversight leads to a reduction in the intensity and overall emissions of both water and air pollutants. Enterprises respond by increasing their utilization of clean energy sources, reducing their reliance on fossil fuels, and enhancing their pollution control infrastructure to mitigate emissions. Notably, there is no evidence suggesting that enterprises curtail production levels to reduce emissions. Therefore, it is crucial to develop a rational understanding of the relationship between environmental protection and economic performance. In addition, tailored policies should be formulated to enable precise pollution control measures and facilitate the pursuit of high-quality development.