Ketogenic therapy in the form of ketogenic diets or calorie restriction has been proposed as a metabolic treatment of high grade glioma (HGG) brain tumors based on mechanistic reasoning obtained mainly from animal experiments. Given the paucity of clinical studies of this relatively new approach, our goal is to extrapolate evidence from the greater number of animal studies and synthesize it with the available human data in order to estimate the expected effects of ketogenic therapy on survival in HGG patients. At the same time we are using this analysis as an example for demonstrating how Bayesianism can be applied in the spirit of a circular view of evidence. A Bayesian hierarchical model was developed. Data from three human cohort studies and 17 animal experiments were included to estimate the effects of four ketogenic interventions (calorie restriction/ketogenic diets as monotherapy/combination therapy) on the restricted mean survival time ratio in humans using various assumptions for the relationships between humans, rats and mice. The impact of different biological assumptions about the relevance of animal data for humans as well as external information based on mechanistic reasoning or case studies was evaluated by specifying appropriate priors. We provide statistical and philosophical arguments for why our approach is an improvement over existing (frequentist) methods for evidence synthesis as it is able to utilize evidence from a variety of sources. Depending on the prior assumptions, a 30–70% restricted mean survival time prolongation in HGG patients was predicted by the models. The highest probability of a benefit (> 90%) for all four ketogenic interventions was obtained when adopting an enthusiastic prior based on previous case reports together with assuming synergism between ketogenic therapies with other forms of treatment. Combinations with other treatments were generally found more effective than ketogenic monotherapy. Combining evidence from both human and animal studies is statistically possible using a Bayesian approach. We found an overall survival-prolonging effect of ketogenic therapy in HGG patients. Our approach is best compatible with a circular instead of hierarchical view of evidence and easy to update once more data become available.
For at least the past 25 years or so, there has been a twofold sense of “crisis” in ecology. One indication of this is the spate of articles and books calling for a reformation of the discipline and bearing such titles as “The New Ecology.” On the part of practitioners, the unease concerns its theories, concepts, and methods. On the part of the general public, the unease concerns the perceived “bias” of its results. This paper is an attempt by two philosophers of science to clarify one critical methodological issue—hypothesis/model testing—and in the process to identify ways to gird the objectivity of ecological claims. What is significant about our approach is a distinction between the tasks appropriate to Bayesian Inference and Evidential Statistics—confirming hypotheses on the one hand and measuring evidence for models on the other. These two inferential paradigms are contrasted with the testing methods long-dominant in the discipline—Fisher-Neyman-Pearson Significance Testing and Popper Falsificationism—and a case made for a much greater use of Bayesian and Evidentialist Methods. In particular, it is argued that Evidential Statistics, here in the form of the likelihood ratios of competing predictive and explanatory multiple models avoids the main forms of otherwise unsettling cognitive bias. It also provides a Darwinian alternative to the “convergence” accounts of objectivity associated with the development of physics which is more appropriate to ecology.
In his book “Medical Philosophy: Conceptual issues in Medicine”, Mario Bunge provides a unique account of medical philosophy that is deeply rooted in a realist ontology he calls “systemism”. According to systemism, the world consists of systems and their parts, and systems possess emergent properties that their parts lack. Events within systems may form causes and effects that are constantly conjoined via particular mechanisms. Bunge supports the views of the evidence-based medicine movement that randomized controlled trials (RCTs) provide the best evidence to establish the truth of causal hypothesis; in fact, he argues that only RCTs have this ability. Here, we argue that Bunge neglects the important feature of patients being open systems which are in steady interaction with their environment. We show that accepting this feature leads to counter-intuitive consequences for his account of medical hypothesis testing. In particular, we point out that (i) the confirmation of hypotheses is inherently stochastic and affords a probabilistic account of both confirmation and evidence which we provide here; (ii) RCTs are neither necessary nor sufficient to establish the truth of a causal claim; (iii) testing of causal hypotheses requires taking into account background knowledge and the context within which an intervention is applied. We conclude that there is no “best” research methodology in medicine, but that different methodologies should coexist in a complementary fashion.
24 February 2010 in International Studies in the Philosophy of Science
We introduce a distinction, unnoticed in the literature, between four varieties of objective Bayesianism. What we call ‘strong objective Bayesianism’ is characterized by two claims, that all scientific inference is ‘logical’ and that, given the same background information two agents will ascribe a unique probability to their priors. We think that neither of these claims can be sustained; in this sense, they are ‘dogmatic’. The first fails to recognize that some scientific inference, in particular that concerning evidential relations, is not (in the appropriate sense) logical, the second fails to provide a non‐question‐begging account of ‘same background information’. We urge that a suitably objective Bayesian account of scientific inference does not require either of the claims. Finally, we argue that Bayesianism needs to be fine‐grained in the same way that Bayesians fine‐grain their beliefs.