Eyal Aharoni

Prof. Eyal Aharoni

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Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

20Years (2007-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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27 March 2013 in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
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Journal Article
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EAEyal Aharoni
Eyal Aharoni
GVGina M. Vincent
Gina M. Vincent
CHCarla L. Harenski
Carla L. Harenski
VCVince D. Calhoun
Vince D. Calhoun
WSWalter Sinnott-Armstrong
Walter Sinnott-Armstrong
KKKent A. Kiehl
Kent A. Kiehl
Identification of factors that predict recurrent antisocial behavior is integral to the social sciences, criminal justice procedures, and the effective treatment of high-risk individuals. Here we show that error-related brain activity elicited during performance of an inhibitory task prospectively predicted subsequent rearrest among adult offenders within 4 y of release (N= 96). The odds that an offender with relatively low anterior cingulate activity would be rearrested were approximately double that of an offender with high activity in this region, holding constant other observed risk factors. These results suggest a potential neurocognitive biomarker for persistent antisocial behavior.

1 May 2012 in Journal of Abnormal Psychology
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Journal Article
Closed access
EAEyal Aharoni
Eyal Aharoni
WSWalter Sinnott-Armstrong
Walter Sinnott-Armstrong
KKKent A. Kiehl
Kent A. Kiehl
A prominent view of psychopathic moral reasoning suggests that psychopathic individuals cannot properly distinguish between moral wrongs and other types of wrongs. The present study evaluated this view by examining the extent to which 109 incarcerated offenders with varying degrees of psychopathy could distinguish between moral and conventional transgressions relative to each other and to nonincarcerated healthy controls. Using a modified version of the classic Moral/Conventional Transgressions task that uses a forced-choice format to minimize strategic responding, the present study found that total psychopathy score did not predict performance on the task. Task performance was explained by some individual subfacets of psychopathy and by other variables unrelated to psychopathy, such as IQ. The authors conclude that, contrary to earlier claims, insufficient data exist to infer that psychopathic individuals cannot know what is morally wrong.

1 November 2013 in Behavioural Brain Research
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Journal Article
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VSVaughn R. Steele
Vaughn R. Steele
EAEyal Aharoni
Eyal Aharoni
GMGillian E. Munro
Gillian E. Munro
VCVince D. Calhoun
Vince D. Calhoun
PNPrashanth Nyalakanti
Prashanth Nyalakanti
KKKent A. Kiehl
Kent A. Kiehl

1 March 2008 in Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences
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EAEyal Aharoni
Eyal Aharoni
CFChadd Funk
Chadd Funk
WSWalter Sinnott‐Armstrong
Walter Sinnott‐Armstrong
MGMichael Gazzaniga
Michael Gazzaniga

1 June 2011 in Journal of Research in Personality
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Journal Article
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EAEyal Aharoni
Eyal Aharoni
OAOlga Antonenko
Olga Antonenko
KKKent A. Kiehl
Kent A. Kiehl

30 April 2024 in Scientific Reports
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Journal Article
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EAEyal Aharoni
Eyal Aharoni
SFSharlene Fernandes
Sharlene Fernandes
DBDaniel J. Brady
Daniel J. Brady
CACaelan Alexander
Caelan Alexander
MCMichael Criner
Michael Criner
VCVictor Crespo
Victor Crespo
Advances in artificial intelligence (AI) raise important questions about whether people view moral evaluations by AI systems similarly to human-generated moral evaluations. We conducted a modified Moral Turing Test (m-MTT), inspired by Allen et al. (Exp Theor Artif Intell 352:24–28, 2004) proposal, by asking people to distinguish real human moral evaluations from those made by a popular advanced AI language model: GPT-4. A representative sample of 299 U.S. adults first rated the quality of moral evaluations when blinded to their source. Remarkably, they rated the AI’s moral reasoning as superior in quality to humans’ along almost all dimensions, including virtuousness, intelligence, and trustworthiness, consistent with passing what Allen and colleagues call the comparative MTT. Next, when tasked with identifying the source of each evaluation (human or computer), people performed significantly above chance levels. Although the AI did not pass this test, this was not because of its inferior moral reasoning but, potentially, its perceived superiority, among other possible explanations. The emergence of language models capable of producing moral responses perceived as superior in quality to humans’ raises concerns that people may uncritically accept potentially harmful moral guidance from AI. This possibility highlights the need for safeguards around generative language models in matters of morality.