We report a chain of 10 kidney transplantations, initiated in July 2007 by a single altruistic donor (i.e., a donor without a designated recipient) and coordinated over a period of 8 months by two large paired-donation registries. These transplantations involved six transplantation centers in five states. In the case of five of the transplantations, the donors and their coregistered recipients underwent surgery simultaneously. In the other five cases, “bridge donors” continued the chain as many as 5 months after the coregistered recipients in their own pairs had received transplants. This report of a chain of paired kidney donations, in which the transplantations were not necessarily performed simultaneously, illustrates the potential of this strategy.

Since 2008, kidney exchange in America has grown in part from the incorporation of nondirected donors in transplant chains rather than simple exchanges. It is controversial whether these chains should be performed simultaneously 'domino-paired donation', (DPD) or nonsimultaneously 'nonsimultaneous extended altruistic donor, chains (NEAD). NEAD chains create 'bridge donors' whose incompatible recipients receive kidneys before the bridge donor donates, and so risk reneging by bridge donors, but offer the opportunity to create more transplants by overcoming logistical barriers inherent in simultaneous chains. Gentry et al. simulated whether DPD or NEAD chains would produce more transplants when chain segment length was limited to three transplants, and reported that DPD performed at least as well as NEAD chains. As this finding contrasts with the experience of several groups involved in kidney-paired donation, we performed simulations that allowed for longer chain segments and used actual patient data from the Alliance for Paired Donation. When chain segments of 4-6 transplants are allowed in the simulations, NEAD chains produce more transplants than DPD. Our simulations showed not only more transplants as chain length increased, but also that NEAD chains produced more transplants for highly sensitized and blood type O recipients.

Organ shortage is the major limitation to kidney transplantation in the developed world. Conversely, millions of patients in the developing world with end‐stage renal disease die because they cannot afford renal replacement therapy—even when willing living kidney donors exist. This juxtaposition between countries with funds but no available kidneys and those with available kidneys but no funds prompts us to propose an exchange program using each nation's unique assets. Our proposal leverages the cost savings achieved through earlier transplantation over dialysis to fund the cost of kidney exchange between developed‐world patient–donor pairs with immunological barriers and developing‐world patient–donor pairs with financial barriers. By making developed‐world health care available to impoverished patients in the developing world, we replace unethical transplant tourism with global kidney exchange—a modality equally benefitting rich and poor. We report the 1‐year experience of an initial Filipino pair, whose recipient was transplanted in the United states with an American donor's kidney at no cost to him. The Filipino donor donated to an American in the United States through a kidney exchange chain. Follow‐up care and medications in the Philippines were supported by funds from the United States. We show that the logistical obstacles in this approach, although considerable, are surmountable.

We propose a Medicare Demonstration Project to develop a standard acquisition charge for kidney paired donation. A new payment strategy is required because Medicare and commercial insurance companies may not directly pay living donor costs intended to lead to transplantation of a beneficiary of a different insurance provider. Until the 1970s, when organ procurement organizations were empowered to serve as financial intermediaries to pay the upfront recovery expenses for deceased donor kidneys before knowing the identity of the recipient, there existed similar limitations in the recovery and placement of deceased donor organs. Analogous to the recovery of deceased donor kidneys, kidney paired donation requires the evaluation of living donors before identifying their recipient. Tissue typing, crossmatching and transportation of living donors or their kidneys represent additional financial barriers. Finally, the administrative expenses of the organizations that identify and coordinate kidney paired donation transplantation require reimbursement akin to that necessary for organ procurement organizations. To expand access to kidney paired donation for more patients, we propose a model to reimburse paired donation expenses analogous to the proven strategy used for over 30 years to pay for deceased donor solid organ transplantation in America.

Extracorporeal porcine liver perfusion is being developed as a bridge to liver allotransplantation for patients with fulminant hepatic failure. This strategy is limited by porcine Kupffer cell destruction of human erythrocytes, mediated by lectin binding of a sialic acid motif in the absence of antibody and complement. Sialoadhesin, a macrophage restricted lectin that binds sialic acid, was originally described as a sheep erythrocyte binding receptor. Given similarities between sialoadhesin and the unidentified macrophage lectin in our model, we hypothesized porcine sialoadhesin contributed to recognition of human erythrocytes. Two additional types of macrophages were identified to bind human erythrocytes—spleen and alveolar. Expression of sialoadhesin was confirmed by immunofluorescence in porcine tissues and by flow cytometry on primary macrophages. A stable transgenic cell line expressing porcine sialoadhesin (pSn CHO) bound human erythrocytes, while a sialoadhesin mutant cell line did not. Porcine macrophage and pSn CHO recognition of human erythrocytes was inhibited approximately 90% by an antiporcine sialoadhesin monoclonal antibody and by human erythrocyte glycoproteins. Furthermore, this binding was substantially reduced by sialidase treatment of erythrocytes. These data support the hypothesis that porcine sialoadhesin is a xenogeneic receptor that mediates porcine macrophage binding of human erythrocytes in a sialic acid-dependent manner.

Failure to convert computer‐identified possible kidney paired donation (KPD) exchanges into transplants has prohibited KPD from reaching its full potential. This study analyzes the progress of exchanges in moving from “offers” to completed transplants. Offers were divided into individual segments called 1‐way transplants in order to calculate success rates. From 2007 to 2014, the Alliance for Paired Donation performed 243 transplants, 31 in collaboration with other KPD registries and 194 independently. Sixty‐one of 194 independent transplants (31.4%) occurred via cycles, while the remaining 133 (68.6%) resulted from nonsimultaneous extended altruistic donor (NEAD) chains. Thirteen of 35 (37.1%) NEAD chains with at least three NEAD segments accounted for 68% of chain transplants (8.6 tx/chain). The “offer” and 1‐way success rates were 21.9 and 15.5%, respectively. Three reasons for failure were found that could be prospectively prevented by changes in protocol or software: positive laboratory crossmatch (28%), transplant center declined donor (17%) and pair transplanted outside APD (14%). Performing a root cause analysis on failures in moving from offer to transplant has allowed the APD to improve protocols and software. These changes have improved the success rate and the number of transplants performed per year.