Suriya Kumacheva

Dr. Suriya Kumacheva

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Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

12Years (2015-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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1 October 2015
Verified
Conference Paper
Closed access
EGElena Gubar
Elena Gubar
SKSuriya Kumacheva
Suriya Kumacheva
EZEkaterina Zhitkova
Ekaterina Zhitkova
OPOlga Porokhnyavaya
Olga Porokhnyavaya
Tax control is one of the most important tools for the administration of the tax system (fiscal, social, regulatory and control). Tax audit enables to increase the revenue of taxes and fees in the state budget. Assume that each taxpayer can declare his income less then his true income level, however total tax audits of the taxpayers' population is economically unreasonable and even selective tax audits are not always profitable. Though, the tax authority needs to stimulate taxpayers to pay taxes, correspondingly to their true income. One possible way of such stimulation is spreading of information about future tax auditing. In this case the propagation of the information can be viewed as an “infection of the mind”, and its spreading shows an interesting resemblance to that of epidemics. To describe the spreading process we can use a modification of classical Susceptible-Infected-Recovery (SIR) model. We study a model of information spreading in large population of taxpayers and describe the dynamics of the model on complex social networks. We formulate an optimal control problem for the tax auditing policy and analyze the behavior of agents in different subgroups depending on the social connections between their agents.

1 May 2017
Verified
Conference Paper
Closed access
EGElena Gubar
Elena Gubar
SKSuriya Kumacheva
Suriya Kumacheva
EZEkaterina Zhitkova
Ekaterina Zhitkova
ZKZlata Kurnosykh
Zlata Kurnosykh
We consider an impact of spreading information about future tax audits on strategies of a population of taxpayers. We suppose that each agent selects the best method of behavior, which depends on the behavior of other agents. Its assumed that all taxpayers pay taxes in accordance with their income, if they know that the probability of an audit is high. Though one share of agents can hide their true income and then such behavior provokes the tax audit. However total audit is very expensive, hence fiscal system should choose new instruments to force the tax collection. We formulate an evolutionary model with network structure which describes the changes in the population of taxpayers under the impact of information about tax audit.

1 January 2019 in Vestnik of Saint Petersburg University. Applied Mathematics. Computer Science. Control Processes
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
EGElena Gubar
Elena Gubar
EZEkaterina Zhitkova
Ekaterina Zhitkova
SKSuriya Kumacheva
Suriya Kumacheva
GTGalina Tomilina
Galina Tomilina

18 July 2018
Verified
Book Chapter
Closed access
PDF file
SKSuriya Kumacheva
Suriya Kumacheva
EGElena Gubar
Elena Gubar
EZEkaterina Zhitkova
Ekaterina Zhitkova
GTGalina Tomilina
Galina Tomilina


1 October 2016
Verified
Book Chapter
Closed access
PDF file
EGElena Gubar
Elena Gubar
SKSuriya Kumacheva
Suriya Kumacheva
EZEkaterina Zhitkova
Ekaterina Zhitkova
OPOlga Porokhnyavaya
Olga Porokhnyavaya