In contemporary Russia, geopolitical discourses have become more important than political ideology proper, so the “Russian world” concept is rising to the position of an all-embracing ideology, which maintains that Russia is or should be politically and geographically bigger than the Russian Federation. This means that the idea of “spheres of influence” is embedded into the concept. At the same time, the paper argues that the meaning of the “Russian world” has been differently articulated and differently instrumentalized for political purposes during the last 20 years. It would be an oversimplification to believe that “Russian world” has always been a mere synonym for Russia’s neo-imperialist pursuits in the post-Soviet arena. Focusing on discontinuities, the paper identifies three ideological iterations of the “Russian world.” The first was de-territorialized and de-centered imagery of the “Russian archipelago” in the 1990s. The second represents adjustment of the concept to the idea of the “sovereign democracy” in the 2000s, when the logic of the “sphere of influence” was injected into the “Russian world.” Third, in the 2010s, the “Russian world” has been re-territorialized as an irredentist and isolationist project, aligned with the logic of representing Russia as an alternative, non-Western model of modernity. The bottom line of the argument is that in spite of many innovative and potentially progressive connotations, the “Russian world“ concept has displayed a marked tendency towards conservative and anti-Western criticism of globalization, which is characteristic of the logic of the spheres of influence.
2 November 2014 in Eurasian Geography and Economics
This article analyzes how the Russian annexation of Crimea in March 2014 has been represented and discussed on social networks. It argues that the key metaphors and discursive strategies, which have been developed in the digital environment, have been prefigured in Russian geopolitical culture and popular imagination since Crimea’s first accession to Russia in 1783. The central geopolitical trope of Crimea as either a “metonymy” of the empire or its “alter ego” reverberates in today’s online discussions. Engaging with the debates on the political potential of the Russian “blogosphere,” the article comes to conclusions that Russian “digital geopolitics” tries to foster grass-roots activism but at the same time paradoxically disempowers them. The government’s project to mobilize people’s support of its policy in Ukraine lies at the core of this failure. Using geopolitical rhetoric and the tongue-in-cheek criticism of the Western liberal model, the state inhibits the development of people’s political subjectivity, undermines the belief in their ability to comprehend and influence the “great geopolitical game,” and nurtures the culture of corrosive irony toward any master-narrative, the Kremlin’s one included.
The essay inquires into the cultural production of ‘Novorossiya’ as a politically-coloured territorial ‘brand’, promoted by pro-Kremlin intellectuals, activists of the Donbas rebellion, and internet users. It argues that ‘Novorossiya’ is not only constructed from the building blocks of historical traditions, but also framed by geographical metaphors in popular imagination. Drawing on studies in critical geopolitics and fan fiction, this research interprets ‘Novorossiya’s’ constituency in the Russian-language internet as a sort of political ‘fandom’. Relative to the annexation of Crimea, however, this ‘brand’ has been less successful on the ‘market’ of geopolitical projects.
This article explores one of the oldest controversies over Slavophile thought: the question of whether it is a form of liberalism or conservatism. The author reassesses understudied neo-Slavophile ideologists through the prism of the debates on the public sphere. The paper focuses on the popular journalist S. F. Sharapov (1855-1911) and his utopias. Sharapov and the plethora of the Slavophile intellectuals, such as N. P. Aksakov, A. A. Kireev, D. A. Khomiakov, I. F. Romanov, A. G. Shcherbatov, and A. V. Vasil'ev, worked out a project of autocracy based upon local self-government. Their project featured such elements of liberalism as humanism, freedom of conscience and the press, and toleration of the non-Russian and non-Orthodox subjects of the Empire. One of the central themes of the neo-Slavophile project was criticism of the bureaucratic imperial regime and offering proposals of comprehensive reforms. At the same time, neo-Slavophilism embraced anti-Semitism and a deep-rooted aversion to the West and Western political practices. The distinctiveness of the neo-Slavophiles consisted of the Messianic belief in Russia's uniqueness and ability to develop a 'truly liberal' political regime, in which rigorously observed Christian morality would be present alongside civil rights and freedoms. The paper argues that Slavophilism is not a repository of ready-made illiberal ideas, but a practice of social criticism, which comes up when attempts at political modernization in Russia are half-hearted or have failed.