GY Lv

GY Lv


Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

5Years (2022-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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1 June 2022 in Management Science
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
PHPeng Huang
Peng Huang
GLGY Lv
GY Lv
YXYi Xu
Yi Xu
Managing the quality of complementary applications is vital to the success of a two-sided platform. While prior research has focused solely on restricting platform access based on a quality threshold, we compare three quality regulation strategies: (1) the platform excludes access to low-quality complementors, (2) it provides a fixed amount of subsidy to high-quality complementors, and (3) it develops its own high-quality applications in addition to those from third-party complementors. Our analyses reveal that the widely adopted exclusion strategy is a special case of the subsidization strategy, and it does not always benefit the platform. In contrast, both subsidization and first-party applications strategies render the platform owner better off, with higher profits, higher average quality, and a larger consumer network, but only subsidization always improves social welfare. In addition, the trade-off between subsidization and first-party applications strategies depends on the development cost of first-party applications and the fraction of high-quality complementors, but the relationship is not monotonic. Our results demonstrate that the platform does not have to sacrifice application quantity for higher application quality. With the right choices, it can profitably improve both measures simultaneously. This research provides concrete guidelines to help platform managers make decisions about regulating the quality of complementary applications.This paper was accepted by Anandhi Bharadwaj, information systems.

16 June 2023 in Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
HHHuaqing Hu
Huaqing Hu
GLGY Lv
GY Lv
TCT.C.E. Cheng
T.C.E. Cheng
YZYunhuan Zhang
Yunhuan Zhang

2 October 2022 in International Journal of Electronic Commerce
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
QFQi Fu
Qi Fu
GLGY Lv
GY Lv
We study platform competition in two-sided markets, where consumers value not only the number of providers on the other side of platforms but also their quality. In this context, enhancing provider quality is critical in the competition, and platforms may incentivize high-quality providers to join the platforms with a subsidy. The article examines a two-stage competition game between two platforms who decide their quality-based subsidization strategy and access fees charged to both sides of the platforms. We derive the equilibrium outcomes of the two competing platforms under different subsidization strategy scenarios, and provide insights on the impact of subsidization on platforms’ pricing, network sizes, quality, profits, and social welfare in a competitive setting. Our study shows that in competitive environment, subsidization is a double-edged sword that can lead to a prisoner’s dilemma for platforms, despite quality improvement. We also find that while subsidization has a positive quality effect that always increases consumer surplus, it may hurt provider surplus if the same-side competition effect among providers is too strong, which negatively affects provider surplus and may drive out low-quality providers under subsidization. As a consequence, the total social welfare also hinges on the provider side competition intensity.

23 September 2026 in Naval Research Logistics (NRL)
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
PDF file
PCPascale Crama
Pascale Crama
GLGY Lv
GY Lv
YXYi Xu
Yi Xu