Mohsen Khalaf

Dr. Mohsen Khalaf


Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

9Years (2018-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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26 September 2018 in IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
Mohsen KhalafMohsen Khalaf
Mohsen Khalaf
AYAmr Youssef
Amr Youssef
Ehab El-SaadanyEhab El-Saadany
Ehab El-Saadany
The ability to maintain the system frequency within its specified operating limits is crucial for the stability and proper operation of power systems. Any small deviation out of the permissible frequency range must be well-mitigated by the Automatic Generation Control (AGC) system, otherwise it may result in disruption of operation and/or damage to the power grid equipment. The data required by the AGC control system are sent to the control center through communication links which are susceptible to cyber attacks. Therefore, such AGC systems have to be well-protected against False Data Injection (FDI) attacks. In this work, the use of a simultaneous input and state estimation based algorithm to detect and concurrently compensate for FDI attacks against the measurements of AGC systems is investigated. Throughout the use of this algorithm, the FDI attack signal is dealt with as an unknown input and its value is estimated accordingly. Then, the estimated value for the FDI is used to compensate for the effect of the attack so that the control center makes its decision based on the corrected sensor signals, and not the manipulated ones. The proposed approach is tested under different types of FDI attacks and the simulation results for a 2-area and a 4-area practical system confirm its ability to detect, estimate FDI attacks and successfully compensate for it.

8 February 2024 in IEEE Access
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
Mohsen KhalafMohsen Khalaf
Mohsen Khalaf
AAAbdelrahman Ayad
Abdelrahman Ayad
MTMosaddek Hossain Kamal Tushar
Mosaddek Hossain Kamal Tushar
MKMarthe Kassouf
Marthe Kassouf
DKDeepa Kundur
Deepa Kundur
Distribution systems are evolving from traditional passive networks into, what is known as, Active Distribution Networks (ADNs). Unlike traditional distribution networks, ADNs are characterized by bi-directional power flow, the high penetration of DERs, storage capabilities and sophisticated control strategies. Multiple layers of communications, sensing and computation are being integrated into ADNs for monitoring, control and protection of a variety of components and critical operations. This enhanced dependency on information and communication technologies, however, increases the exposure of ADNs to cyber-attacks. Several papers have been published in recent years with a focus on cyber-physical security (CPS) of smart grids. However, the published survey papers primarily emphasize the transmission level of smart grid threats and challenges, with little focus on the ADNs. Given the rapid deployment of ADNs and the increasing cyber threats against power grids and critical infrastructures, we are motivated, in this article, to present a review and survey focused, instead, on the latest research advancements in the area of CPS for ADNs. This paper represents the first survey of timely research in the area of CPS of ADNs with a focus on ADN critical operations and components. The cyber-physical aspects of each critical operation/component are analyzed. In addition, the challenges and requirements of associated communication protocols and standards are presented. Cybersecurity of ADN devices and sensors including Phasor Measurement Units (PMUs), smart meters, advanced metering infrastructure and protection relays are discussed in detail. Moreover, a thorough study of ADNs application drivers and enablers including microgrids, Electric Vehicles (EVs), Internet-of-Things (IoT) and smart homes is conducted. Potential and existing solutions by industry are highlighted. Finally, survey outcomes and directions for future work are presented to highlight emerging avenues of research.

1 April 2022 in Electric Power Systems Research
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
AAAbdelrahman Ayad
Abdelrahman Ayad
Mohsen KhalafMohsen Khalaf
Mohsen Khalaf
MSMagdy Salama
Magdy Salama
EEEhab F. El-Saadany
Ehab F. El-Saadany

31 October 2022 in IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
Mohsen KhalafMohsen Khalaf
Mohsen Khalaf
AAAbdelrahman Ayad
Abdelrahman Ayad
MSMagdy M. A. Salama
Magdy M. A. Salama
DKDeepa Kundur
Deepa Kundur
Ehab El-SaadanyEhab El-Saadany
Ehab El-Saadany
This paper investigates the problem of cyber-attacks on Wide-Area Under-Frequency Load Shedding (WAUFLS), as these schemes are critical to maintaining power systems stability. First, we perform a detailed analysis on existing WAUFLS schemes and show that an adversary can launch a False Data Injection (FDI) cyberattack by manipulating the frequency measurements or Power Flow Measurements (PFMs), which may lead to system losses, unnecessary shedding of important loads, and system-wide blackout. Second, to address this vulnerability, we propose a novel R eliable S tates WAUF LS (RSLS) scheme to protect against FDI cyber-attacks. The disturbance calculation and load shedding process in RSLS are based on reliable system states, obtained using a proposed data-classification method on the PFMs that secures the state estimation operation. These reliable states are then used to perform the power flow in order to calculate the power mismatch. The calculated magnitude of disturbance, as well as the obtained system states, are used to decide on the amount and locations of the loadshedding. We validate the effectiveness and accuracy of RSLS by conducting extensive simulation on the IEEE-39 bus New England system using PSCAD/EMTDC. The results confirm the proposed scheme’s capabilities in evaluating system disturbance and performing load-shedding, thus protecting the system during under-frequency conditions, and demonstrate its robustness against FDI attacks.

20 December 2024 in Electric Power Systems Research
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
AEAhmed Abd Elaziz Elsayed
Ahmed Abd Elaziz Elsayed
Mohsen KhalafMohsen Khalaf
Mohsen Khalaf
MMMansour Ahmed Mohamed
Mansour Ahmed Mohamed
MNMohamed AbdelAzim Ibrahim Nayel
Mohamed AbdelAzim Ibrahim Nayel
DKDeepa Kundur
Deepa Kundur

24 January 2025 in ACM Transactions on Cyber-Physical Systems
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
AMAmr S. Mohamed
Amr S. Mohamed
DKDeepa Kundur
Deepa Kundur
Mohsen KhalafMohsen Khalaf
Mohsen Khalaf
Smart grids are critical cyber-physical systems that are vital to our energy future. Smart grids’ fault resilience is dependent on the use of advanced protection systems that can reliably adapt to changing grid conditions. The vast amount of operational data generated and collected in smart grids can be used to develop these protection systems. However, given the safety-criticality of protection, the algorithms used to analyze this data must be stable, transparent, and easily interpretable to ensure the reliability of the protection decisions. Additionally, the protection decisions must be fast, selective, simple, and reliable. To address these challenges, this article proposes a data-driven protection strategy, based on Gaussian Discriminant Analysis, for fault detection and isolation. This strategy minimizes the communication requirements for time-inverse relays, facilitates their coordination, and optimizes their settings. The interpretability of the protection decisions is a key focus of this article. The method is demonstrated by showing how it can protect the medium-voltage CIGRE network as it transitions between islanded and grid-connected modes and radial and mesh topologies.