Reconfigurable Intelligent Surface (RIS)-assisted Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) communications face a critical security threat from impersonation attacks, where adversaries impersonate legitimate entities to infiltrate networks to obtain private data or unauthorized access. To combat such security threats, this paper proposes a novel physical layer (PHY-layer) authentication scheme for validating UAV identity in RIS-enabled UAV wireless networks. Considering that most existing works focus on traditional communication systems such as IoT and millimeter wave multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) systems, there is currently no mature PHY-layer authentication scheme to serve RIS-UAV communication systems. To this end, our scheme leverages the unique characteristics of cascaded channels related to RIS to verify the legitimacy of UAV transmitting signals to the base station (BS). To be more precise, we first use the least squares estimate method and coordinate a descent-based algorithm to extract the cascaded channel feature. Next, we explore a quantizer to quantize the fluctuations of the channel gain that are related to the extracted channel feature. The 1-bit quantizer’s output findings are exploited to generate the authentication decision criteria, which are then tested using a binary hypothesis. The statistical signal processing technique is utilized to obtain the analytical formulations for detection and false alarm probabilities. We also conduct a computational complexity analysis of the proposed scheme. Finally, the numerical results validate the effectiveness of the proposed performance metric models and show that our detection performance can reach over 90% accuracy at a low signal-to-noise ratio (e.g., −8 dB), with a 10% improvement in detection accuracy compared with existing schemes.
In the sixth generation and Internet of Things (6G-IoT) systems, impersonation attacks pose significant risks due to the high interconnectivity, and complexity of devices. This study develops a new, improved physical layer (PHY-layer) authentication method to counter impersonation attacks in an 6G-IoT system by leveraging radiation pattern feature in gain, phase, and position errors. We analyze the statistical behavior of radiation pattern with random errors in gain, phase, and position, and establish statistical models based on this analysis. Subsequently, we devise an authentication scheme that utilizes these statistical models to validate the legitimacy of the IoT device. Finally, a performance assessment has been carried out to validate the dependability and efficacy of the authentication scheme across diverse settings.
This letter presents a novel Physical (PHY)-layer authentication framework for a Millimeter Wave (mmWave) Multiple-Input Multiple-Output (MIMO) Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV)-ground system. We first employ the Laplace prior technique to develop a new statistical model to efficiently characterize the angular-domain mmWave MIMO channels and to accurately depict the channel sparsity behavior in the concerned system. Based on the proposed new channel model and channel sparsity feature, we apply the Likelihood Ratio Test (LRT) to construct an authentication framework. We also derive closed-form expressions for critical authentication performance metrics like detection and false alarm probabilities and validate the theoretical framework through extensive simulations.
1 April 2026 in Digital Communications and Networks
This letter presents a robust physical-layer (PHY-layer) authentication framework for millimeter-wave (mmWave) multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) systems by jointly exploiting spatial channel features and hardware-induced impairments. A CANDECOMP/PARAFAC (CP) tensor decomposition is employed to extract path, angle, and array error features, which are individually classified via binary hypothesis testing. The final decision is obtained through weighted fusion. Closed-form expressions for false alarm and detection probabilities are derived, and simulations confirm the method’s high accuracy and robustness under various spoofing attacks.
Impersonation attacks pose a significant threat to millimeter wave (mmWave) wireless systems due to the unique characteristics (e.g., highly directional beams) of mmWave communications. To this end, this paper proposes a novel physical layer authentication (PLA) scheme that leverages the antenna array-specific mutual coupling (MC) feature to validate the identity of the transmitter. In particular, we first demonstrate the authentication feasibility of the MC feature by modeling its amplitude and phase characteristics using generalized Gaussian and Laplace distributions, respectively. Then, based on the amplitude and phase of the MC feature, we design a kernel-based authentication scheme to further improve device distinguishability in mmWave systems. Moreover, we provide analytical expressions of the false alarm and detection probabilities, enabling a theoretical characterization of the proposed authentication scheme performance. Finally, numerical results are provided to verify the reliability and effectiveness of the proposed authentication scheme under various settings. The results indicate that the proposed scheme can provide performance gain compared to the single-dimensional feature-based schemes under different signal–noise ratio scenarios.